Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: The Case of Lithuania by NAKROSIS, Vitalis
Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies
Assessing Governmental Capabilities 
to Manage European Affairs:


























































































































































































EUI Working Paper RSC No. 2000/58
Nakrosis: Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage 



























































































The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
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The Robert Schuman Centre’s Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European 
Union in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of 
attention. The scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two 
areas of research have been prioritized:
1/The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre’s Programme, as
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute.
This paper was written within the project on The Eastward Enlargement of the 
European Union: the Cases of the Baltic States - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
which was set up by the Robert Schuman Centre through the support of the 
Academy of Finland. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 






















































































































































































INTRODUCTION: THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN ANALYSIS1
The Lithuanian government’s policy with regard to the European Union (EU) is 
passing through a particularly difficult period. It has become increasingly 
criticised, not only by the European Commission2, but also by the national 
legislature3. It is primarily the EU’s pressure to decommission Lithuania’s 
nuclear power plant that is blamed by the Lithuanian government for its failure 
to secure a place within the EU’s first-wave enlargement.4 In contrast, this 
analysis argues that major difficulties that are encountered by the Lithuanian 
government in acceding to the EU can be explained in terms of its weak 
governmental capabilities to manage EU matters5.
The evolution of Lithuanian governmental capabilities is at the centre of 
this analysis. This research question is important for several reasons. From the 
theoretical perspective, an analysis of Lithuanian governmental capabilities may 
shed some light on the evolution of governmental capabilities to manage EU 
matters in small and post-communist countries. This question resonates with 
Olsen’s (1995b) argument that the focus of scholarly attention has to be moved 
from examining formal changes to the EU’s organisation and functions to 
looking at institutional capabilities for action.6 In addition, since this research 
question examines the EU’s impact on the development of governmental 
capabilities in Lithuania, it is similar to Grabbe’s (1999) argument that it is
1 This research paper was made possible by the research project ‘The Eastward Enlargement 
of the European Union: the Case of the Baltic States’ undertaken by the Robert Schuman 
Centre, European University Institute in co-operation with the Academy of Finland. I 
gratefully acknowledge helpful comments provided by H. Grabbe, M. Haverland, J. P. Olsen, 
J. Trestour, T. Verheijen, R. Vilpisauskas, J. Zielonka and two anonymous reviewers.
2 See the Commission Opinion on Lithuania's Application for Membership of the European 
Union, 1997 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/enlarge/agenda2000_en/op_lithuania/b34.htm) 
and
Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/enlarge/report_ll_98_en/index.htm).
3 See Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komiteto Isvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nacionalines Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 
Programos Administratima, Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, 1999, Valstybes Zinios.
4 See Lietuvos Rytas, 18 March 1999, ‘Komisijos Atstovas Vel Pagrasino Lietuvai’, p. 2 or 
Agence Europe, 22 July 1998, ‘Closure of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant has to be Part of 
Lithuanian Energy Strategy Says van der Broek -  Progress in Preparing the Country for 
Membership’.
5 This analysis defines EU matters (or the Lithuanian EU policy) by making an arbitrary 
distinction between the administration of EU matters and the administration of non-EU 
matters for analytical purposes. We are aware that isolating European affairs from other 
public affairs is increasingly difficult with the expansion of EU business during the pre­
accession process.
6 J. P. Olsen, European Challenges to the Nation State, Arena Working Paper, No. 14/95, 




























































































important to consider the extent to which, and the ways in which, the EU affects 
domestic EU policies in the CEECs.7
Lithuania’s desire to join the EU stems largely from its concerns 
regarding security. The primary perception of EU membership as ‘a medium- 
term security generator’ in part explains Vilnius’ disappointment with the 
European Commission’s recommendation to the Council not to invite Lithuania 
into the first round of negotiations.8 However, it is clear that Lithuania’s ability 
to enhance its security through EU membership depends greatly on its 
governmental capabilities to assume the obligations of EU membership spelled 
out by the Copenhagen criteria.9 Lithuania’s governmental capabilities for 
administering EU matters will affect not only Lithuania’s ability to benefit from 
EU membership, but also the EU’s governance capacity, in particular the 
uniform application and enforcement of the acquis.
The importance of governmental capabilities extends much wider than 
just the Lithuanian EU policy. In all transitional countries state capacity­
building, needed for the protection of law and order as well as the enhancement 
of economic prosperity, is key to the process of transition. As Norgaard (1996) 
concluded, ‘Lithuania has to improve the technical capacity and administrative 
efficiency of the state administration’ in order to successfully manage the 
process of economic transition, which involves among other things the 
regulation of economic activities.10 Thus, this analysis can to a large extent 
illuminate the extent to which Lithuanian governmental capabilities allow for 
the effective management of transition and delivery of public goods. Finally, 
this research question can also shed some light on the current (and future) value 
and legitimacy of the Lithuanian state, measured in terms of its effectiveness 
and efficiency in delivering its goals.11
7 H. Grabbe, A Partnership for Accession? The Nature, Scope and Implications of Emerging 
EU Conditionality for CEE Applicants, EUI, Robert Schuman Centre, Working Paper, 1999.
8 G. P. Herd, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement’, in K. Herderson (ed.) Back to Europe: 
Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, UCL Press, 1999, p. 261. This 
recommendation was followed by a controversial article published by the Minister of 
European Affairs which blamed large member states, in particular Germany, for obstructing 
Lithuania’s accession to the EU. Lietuvos Aidas, 29 October 1997, ‘As Jus Myliu, Bet 
Niekam Nesakykite’, pp. 4-5.
9 They include stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with competitive 
pressures and market forces within the EU and the ability to take on the obligations of 
membership. Commission of the European Communities, European Council: Conclusions of 
the Presidency, Bulletin of the European Union, Copenhagen, 1993.
10 O. Norgaard, The Baltic States after Independence, Edvard Elgar, 1996, p. 225.
11 J. P. Olsen, Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics, Arena Working Paper, No. 9/95, 




























































































It is important to define the relationship between the process of national 
adaptation to European integration and the evolution of governmental 
capabilities to administer European affairs.12 While the analysis of national 
adaptation is often limited to detailing the substitution of old institutions and 
policies with new ones in response to explicit or implicit European 
requirements, the analysis of governmental capabilities has the potential to delve 
deeper by looking at the extent to which the adaptation process leads to the 
emergence of adequate governmental capabilities. Additionally, the fact that the 
EU’s Phare programme explicitly refers to reinforcing administrative and 
institutional capacity in the CEECs as one of its most important objectives 
allows one to examine the impact of not only domestic reform efforts, but also 
European efforts on developing governmental capabilities in Lithuania.
Conceptualising Governmental Capabilities
The development of governmental capabilities will be analysed primarily by 
looking at Lithuania’s ability to transpose EU law (which currently dominates 
the Lithuanian EU policy), to anticipate the impact of EU law at the national 
level, to form coherent negotiating positions for representing its interests at the 
EU level and to implement and enforce the acquis. This analysis is primarily 
concerned with the adequacy of Lithuanian governmental capabilities or, in 
other words, the extent to which Lithuanian governmental capabilities allow for 
the effective administration of different EU matters. Effectiveness is defined 
here as the degree to which Lithuanian authorities are able to achieve objectives, 
laid out either separately by the Lithuanian government or jointly by the 
Lithuanian government and the European institutions. Lithuania’s governmental 
capabilities will be analysed by looking at the evolution of institutional 
constraints upon the effective administration of EU matters. It is assumed here 
that an indication that constraints are becoming less binding shows that 
Lithuanian governmental capabilities are becoming more adequate and visa 
versa. It is expected that institutional constraints, defined by internal and 
external factors, affect governmental capabilities in the way specified in Figure 
1. It is important to note that this analysis is not entirely based on this 
assumption. The evolution of governmental capabilities is also analysed by 
looking at the management of the NPAA.
12 One can mention such studies as Andersen and Eliassen (1993), Olsen (1995a), Olsen 
(1995b), Meny, Muller and Quermonne (1996), Bulmer and Burch (1998), Hanf and 




























































































Figure 1 Framework for Assessing Governmental Capabilities
Governmental
capabilities
That influence governments’ 
ability to make and 
implement
Public policies
That influence the quality of 
socio-economic
Policy outcomes
Source: adapted from R. K. Weaver and B. A. Rockman (eds) Do Institutions Matter? 
Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, The Brookings Institution, 




























































































In this analysis the term ‘governmental capabilities’ refers to the ability of the 
Lithuanian government to exercise EU matters through both individual 
institutions and institutional relationships. This can be contrasted with the 
primary emphasis of many previous studies on individual institutions. The 
Commission in its avis (1997b) and regular reports (1998a) on the CEECs 
utilised the single institution as a main unit of analysis for evaluating 
administrative and institutional capacity.13 Similarly, another study stressed the 
importance of human resources within individual institutions to the adoption of 
the acquis.14 15This focus on individual institutions is too narrow as it omits 
institutional relationships despite their significant impact on governmental 
capabilities. Institutional relationships are important because the administration 
of Brussels affairs includes extensive co-ordination of inter-ministerial matters 
at the domestic level, at the EU level and at the domestic-EU interface." From 
the theoretical perspective, the most appropriate unit for analysis within the 
public administration must not be the single organisation, but rather 
organisational networks.16
Since the institutional constraints that affect governmental capabilities are 
usually defined by a highly complex set of factors, one needs to define the scope 
of this analysis. It is not aimed to provide an all-encompassing conceptualisation 
of governmental capabilities. Even if such conceptualisation were possible, the 
number of factors involved would make the analysis unwieldy. Thus, this 
analysis is primarily concerned with the impact of independent variables found 
within the administrative and governmental level on the evolution of 
governmental capabilities. This focus can be in part justified by the fact that 
Lithuania, along with other CEECs, inherited an administrative structure that is 
strong relative to the political institutions. Its power to administer Brussels 
matters is strengthened by the very nature of the EU, which delegates the 
primary responsibility for EU matters to the administrative level.
One must recognise that a number of institutional constraints matter to 
governmental capabilities. The most important of these that are examined by this 
analysis seem to be the following:
13 See the Commission Opinion on Lithuania’s Application for Membership o f the European 
Union, 1997 and Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s Progress Towards 
Accession, 1998.
14 H. G. Krenzler and M. Everson, Preparing for the Acquis Communautaire, EUI, Robert 
Schuman Centre, Policy Paper, No. 98/6, 1998.
15 V. Wright, ‘The National Co-ordination of European Policy-Making: Negotiating the 
Quagmire’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-Making, Routledge, 
1996, p. 149.
16 B. G. Peters, ‘Managing Horizontal Government: the Politics of Co-ordination’, Public 




























































































(i) Institutional constraints that affect capabilities of individual 
institutions:
- ministerial organisation;
- number of officials and their distribution;
- staff management, including recruitment, training, career development, 
pay conditions, turnover;
- ministerial decision-making, including intra-departmental relationships;
(ii) Institutional constraints that affect institutional relationships:
- government organisation, including the establishment of co-ordinating 
institutions or committees;
- distribution of officials and their mobility within the civil service; 
formal and informal governmental decision-making processes, including 
co-ordination and implementation processes and culture;
- institutional networks, including the integration of interest organisations 
into the policy process and the emergence of ‘policy communities’.
Political factors are also covered by this analysis. However, it is difficult to 
hypothesise the way in which they affect governmental capabilities. Although 
political factors have the potential to considerably influence governmental 
capabilities through individual personalities, party politics in the legislature and 
executive and coalition politics in the cabinet, their impact is highly contingent 
in an uncertain environment of transition, depending among other things on the 
ideological compositions of governing coalitions. In contrast, it must be noted 
that both the evolution of judicial capabilities and the impact of institutional 
constraints that are defined by factors found at the sub-national level fall outside 
the scope of this analysis.
The New Institutionalist Approach
The analysis adopts the new institutionalist approach, which is relevant to the 
assessment of governmental capabilities to manage European matters in 
transition countries. Its basic claim is that institutions do matter. First, it adopts a 
wider interpretation of what constitutes an institution. According to one 
definition, institutions include formal institutions, informal institutions and 
conventions, the norms and symbols embedded in them as well as policy 
instruments and procedures.17 This definition allows for an examination of the 
informal aspects of politics and policy-making, which are crucial to the 
understanding of post-communist politics and policy-making.
17 S. J. Bulmer, ‘New Institutionalism and the Governance of the Single Market’, Journal of 




























































































More specifically, the paper uses two conceptions of new institutional 
theory - the normative institutionalism and the historical institutionalism -  to 
analyse the evolution of governmental capabilities in Lithuania.18 The first 
school of new institutionalism, the normative institutionalism, is associated with 
the work of March and Olsen (1984).19 Its most fundamental proposition is that 
institutional behaviour is shaped by the logic of appropriateness defined by the 
values internal to the institution. By shaping institutional behaviour, institutions 
can constrain or facilitate policy change. It is the logic of appropriateness that 
guides institutional behaviour by setting ‘parameters of acceptable behaviour’.20
The analysis tests the proposition that institutional and policy changes are 
dependent on the extent to which the old logic o f appropriateness is 
institutionalised.21 In other words, it is expected that the more institutions are 
embedded in the existing institutional settings, the less latitude exists for policy 
and institutional reform. Institutionalisation (or embeddedness) is defined here 
as ‘the emergence of enduring practices and rules, structures of meaning, and 
resources’.22 In order to explain different levels of embeddedness, which vary 
across institutions and, probably more significantly, across nations, one must 
make cross-institutional and, in particular, cross-national comparisons. Thus, the 
comparative dimension is introduced into this analysis. Emphasis is put on 
possible sources of divergence between Lithuania and other countries, flowing 
different sets of constrains upon the development of their governmental 
capabilities.
Another school of new institutionalism whose propositions are tested by 
our analysis is historical institutionalism. Its fundamental proposition lies in the 
‘path-dependency’ argument. Its basic idea is that reform outcomes are 
dependent on initial conditions. In the context of transition, it is useful to 
interpret this argument in two ways by employing two different time spans. 
First, path-dependency can be equated with the impact that inherited institutions 
exert upon administrative reform, thus linking the evolution of governmental 
capabilities to the post-communist heritage. Alternatively, path-dependency can 
be equated with the impact of the initial decisions on administrative reform, thus
* Peters recently applied a similar research strategy to the analysis of managerial reform in 
the United States. See B. G. Peters, The New Institutionalism and Administrative Reform: 
Explaining Alternative Models, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, 
EstudioAVorking Paper, No. 1998/113, 1998.
19 J. G. March and J. P. Olsen, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political 
Life’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 78 (1984), pp. 738-749.
20 Peters (1998a), p. 8.
21 A similar hypothesis was tested by Knill (1998). Ch. Knill, ‘European Policies: the Impact 
of National Administrative Traditions’, Journal o f Public Policy, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1- 
28.




























































































linking the evolution of governmental capabilities to policy and institutional 
choices made during the transition. Therefore, it is predicted that both 
institutions inherited from the past affect the evolution o f governmental 
capabilities through constraints upon decision-making23 and initial reform 
choices affect the evolution o f governmental capacities through constraints upon 
decision-making.
Historical institutionalism assesses both the evolutionary and 
transformative models of change.23 4 From the evolutionary perspective, 
institutional change is viewed as incremental and not challenging deeply 
embedded institutions. Thus, in our context, one can predict that the evolution of 
governmental capabilities is subject to a series o f incremental rather than 
radical changes. This analysis also expects different institutions to be subject to 
different change patterns depending on their embeddedness. Alternatively, from 
the transformative point of view, institutional development can be seen as 
interrupted by windows of opportunities bringing possibilities for significant 
change, but not guaranteeing it. If such opportunities are exploited, they 
introduce policy or institutional changes that entail clear departures from 
previously established patterns. It is important to note that both internal and 
external forces can open windows of opportunities. Thus, it allows us to predict 
that the evolution o f governmental capabilities is marked by windows of 
opportunities that may lead to significant policy or institutional changes.
The study is organised into three different sections, followed by a 
conclusion. The first section assesses the mismatch between the nature of 
Lithuanian administration and the EU requirements, which poses institutional 
constraints to the emergence of governmental capabilities to manage EU 
matters. The second section attempts to determine the extent to which 
Lithuanian governmental capabilities for administering EU matters are adequate 
by looking at the impact of institutional constraints, divided into the constraint 
of inadequate human resources and that of ineffective policy co-ordination, on 
the Lithuanian EU policy, in particular the administration of the National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis. The third section focuses on the 
EU’s impact on the evolution of governmental capabilities in Lithuania through 
its financial assistance and agenda-setting instruments.
23 This proposition was borrowed from J. Pontusson, ‘From Comparative Public Policy to 
Political Economy: Putting Political Institutions in their Place and Taking Interests Seriously’, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1995), pp. 118-119.
24 S. Bulmer and M. Burch, ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, the British State and 




























































































THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON LITHUANIA’S 
ADMINISTRATION
This section provides a detailed examination of the external factors affecting 
governmental capabilities to manage European affairs. The analysis assumes 
that they affect governmental capabilities by defining institutional constraints, as 
specified in Figure 1 above. In addition, the binding character of institutional 
constraints depends primarily on the extent to which the nature of Lithuanian 
administration (internal factors) matches the EU-level requirements (external 
factors).25 To determine the specific manifestations of this mismatch, it is 
necessary to undertake a detailed examination of EU requirements and the 
characteristics of Lithuanian administration.
One of the main EU's characteristics is the very large volume of EU 
legislation. It is estimated that the acquis currently consists of over 20,000 
regulations and 2,000 directives, with approximately 80 per cent of socio­
economic legislation applicable in the member states originating from the EU.26 
The ability of Lithuanian central government to adjust to this volume of EU 
legislation within a relatively short period of time is limited by its relatively 
small size (11,000 officials). It must be noted that administrative adjustment 
pressures vary considerably, depending on a particular sector. This puts limits 
on the even evolution of governmental capabilities across different policy fields. 
Such well-developed policy areas in the EU as agriculture or environment pose 
more problems for Lithuanian authorities than such underdeveloped policy areas 
as transport.
Lithuania’s accession to the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) is 
particularly problematic, since it contains numerous provisions, ranging from 
the enforcement of veterinary standards to imposition of various production 
quotas to the monitoring of ‘set-aside’ rules. The following example is 
particularly illustrative. A newly-built Lithuanian piggery with the annual 
capacity of 54,000 and complying with EU veterinary standards applied for 
export license to the EU market. The Commission refused to grant the right to 
export to the EU market on the grounds that the piggery had no guarantee that 
every pig had been vaccinated against swine fever in a 300-kilometre radius,
25 The EU-level requirements can be divided into explicit and implicit. If the former refer to 
different acquis or Accession Partnership provisions, the latter refer to ‘co-ordination and 
planning mechanisms, rebalancing of politics-administration relations, continuity, respect for 
formal rules and obligations, [...], effective monitoring and control mechanisms, and 
increased transparency’. See C. Spanou, ‘European Integration in Administrative Terms: A 
Framework for Analysis and the Greek Case’, Journal o f European Public Policy, Vol. 5, No. 
3 (1998), p. 474.
26 G. Majone, ‘A European Regulatory State’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union: Power 




























































































which extends beyond the Lithuanian jurisdiction to neighbouring countries.27 
Administrative adjustment is also circumscribed by the ‘moving target’ problem. 
The fact that such acquis areas as finance, agriculture and structural funds are 
subject to radical overhaul renders the adjustment process in the CEECs more 
difficult.
Another EU’s feature is its emphasis on the regulation of economic 
activities. The adjustment of Lithuanian administration to the European pattern 
of regulation requires huge reform efforts, in particular the establishment of new 
regulatory institutions and the development of new regulatory skills. Lithuania 
inherited regulatory frameworks incompatible with those in the EU member 
states, in particular in the area of environment where regulation was particularly 
underdeveloped. The Lithuanian regulation still follows the inherited rule that 
‘everything that is not explicitly allowed is forbidden’, which stems from the 
communist tradition. Few European regulatory requirements, e.g. air quality 
standards, entail significant policy innovations for the member states 
themselves28, let alone Lithuania. The principle of mutual recognition of 
regulatory standards, e.g. professional standards, requires knowledge of 
regulatory legislation that is enacted not only by the EU, but also by its member 
states. The sheer size of reforms demanded by the EU renders the estimate that a 
whole decade may be required to make regulation more effective even in the 
most advanced CEECs hardly surprising29.
In addition to regulatory requirements, CEE administrations need to 
adjust to European financial control requirements. In order for the CEECs to 
accede to the CAP and the structural funds, their financial control mechanisms 
must be brought into line with these of the EU. The development of financial 
control, much like the development of regulatory institutions, is limited by the 
post-communist legacy. The CEECs inherited no independent financial control 
and audit institutions and they ‘have no experience of modem “project 
administration” including public procurement with contracts awarded through 
tendering procedures’.30 Currently, financial control in Lithuania is currently 
executed through the Laws on Budgeting, State Control and Local Self- 
government. The Lithuanian administration is presently strengthening the 
internal financial control function and establishing the external performance
27 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Communities, Enlargement and 
Common Agricultural Policy Reform, HL Paper 92, London: HMSO, 1996, p. 30.
28 Majone, p. 265.
29 R. Baldwin, Toward an Integrated Europe, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
1994, p. 193.
30 A. Pratley, ‘Financial Control and Audit in the European Union’, in OECD, Effects of 
European Union Accession, Part 1: Budgeting and Financial Control, Sigma Papers, No. 19, 




























































































control function. Hungary is probably the most advanced applicant country in 
this field, as its recently established internal audit office has already carried out 
an audit of the Phare programme in an attempt to prepare to take control of the 
administration of the EU’s structural funds.31
The implementation and enforcement of voluminous European legislation 
frequently requires significant human and budgetary resources, often more than 
the applicant countries can afford. The CEE ‘skeleton public administrations and 
skeleton budgets’32 puts limits on their ability to effectively apply the acquis. 
This constraint appears to be the most constraining in the case of environment. 
The adoption and enforcement of about 300 pieces of EU environmental 
legislation is impossible without the significant strengthening of existing 
environmental institutions. It was estimated that approximately 15 new officials 
should be recruited to the Environment Ministry and another 20 to its regional 
departments by 2002 to ensure their ability to accomplish their tasks.33 To 
ensure effective implementation and enforcement of environmental provisions, 
new institutions must be established, including a National Agency for 
Environmental Protection or a Chemical Substances and Preparations Control 
Agency. For budgetary resources, it was estimated that the implementation of 
only 15 of the most costly pieces of EU environmental legislation would cost to 
Lithuanian authorities approximately Ecu 3,1 bn. Excluding the most expensive 
directive (70/220/EEC on car pollution) whose costs will be mostly covered by 
the private sector, in 2010 the implementation of the remaining 14 most costly 
pieces of environmental legislation would cost to Lithuanian authorities Ecu 
381,9 min, what amounts to 6,0 per cent of the Lithuania’s 1996 GDP.34
It is important to note that the constraint of limited human resources is 
more binding for some CEECs than others due to significant variations in the 
size of CEE administrations. The similar scope of EU matters and, in turn, 
similar workloads with which all applicant countries are confronted renders the 
size constraint more binding in Lithuania, where approximately 11,000 officials 
are employed in the central government, than in, for instance, Poland, where 
100,000 officials are employed in the central government35 36. If Poland appears to 
be facing a scarcity of human resources in the transposition of the acquis3<s, this 
problem must be more severe in Lithuania. However, this constraint did not
31 Ibid., p. 153.
32 Financial Times, 12 March 1997, ‘Uncertain Map of the Future’, p. 17.
33 Ministry of Environment, Mid-Term Reform Strategy for Environment, Internal Documents, 
1998, p. 9.
34 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
35 J. J. Hesse, ‘Rebuilding the State: Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe’, in 
J.-E. Lane (ed.) Public Sector Reform: Rationale, Trends and Problems, Sage, 1997, p. 138.
36 A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and 




























































































preclude Estonia and Slovenia, both having relatively small civil services, from 
becoming first-wave applicant countries.
This can be explained by two major factors. First, the size constraint has 
not yet fully materialised yet. The readiness of the CEECs to accede to the EU 
was judged on a number of criteria, and progress in implementing and enforcing 
the acquis was not the most important. It has been pointed out that ‘the capacity 
to transpose and implement the acquis [...] was of little importance for the 
selection of formal negotiation partners. Although Slovenia’s score on this point 
fell of short [sic] of all associated countries except Bulgaria and Romania, it was 
admitted to the top group due to its good political and economic record’.37 
However, this constraint, and the difficulties that it poses to Lithuania, is highly 
likely to become more restrictive with a gradual shift of focus from the 
transposition of the acquis to its application, the latter significantly depending 
on human resources. Second, the size constraint must be viewed in the context 
of other constraints, in particular human resource constraints. The Hungarian 
experience shows that governmental capabilities are unlikely to be enhanced by 
merely increasing the number of officials: while the number of Hungarian 
officials increased from 65,000 in 1989 to 95-100,000 in 1995, the effectiveness 
of public administration, including co-ordination, did not improve38.
It is highly likely that the constraint of an inadequate civil service will 
become even more binding with EU membership because it will bring the loss 
of a significant number of the most experienced and senior staff. This was the 
case in many countries, including Spain, where civil servants from the Spanish 
accession management team took up positions in the EU institutions or the 
Spanish Permanent Representation.39 Consequently, this considerably reduced 
the ability of the Spanish government to co-ordinate its domestic decision­
making on EU matters.40 EU membership will bring the further need for the 
Lithuanian administration to improve its ability to formulate coherent 
negotiating positions to ensure that its interests are well represented at the EU 
level. In an attempt to cope with its under-representation at the European level, 
Great Britain has introduced a fast-track recruitment system for European 
posts.41 Thus, the likelihood that the constraint of an inadequate civil service
31 F. Schimmelfennig, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: A Case for 
Sociological Institutionalism, Unpublished Paper, 1998, p. 28-29.
38 OECD, Country Profiles o f Civil Service Training Systems, Sigma Papers, No. 12, Paris: 
OECD, 1997, p. 83.
39 L. Metcalfe, Trends in European Public Administration, European Institute of Public 
Administration, Working Paper, 1993, p.4.
40 Ibid., p. 4.
41 H. Wallace, ‘Relations between the European Union and the British Administration’, in Y. 
Meny, P. Muller and J-L. Quermonne (eds), Adjusting to Europe: the Impact of the European 




























































































will become more binding must be very worrying to Lithuania due to its existing 
difficulties. Even though civil servants with foreign language skills, negotiating 
skills and good knowledge of EU law and EU decision-making procedures are 
scarce in the Lithuania’s civil service, Lithuanian authorities have not yet started 
implementing a comprehensive civil servant training programme on EU matters.
GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITIES FOR MANAGING EUROPEAN 
AFFAIRS IN LITHUANIA
The previous section illustrated the specific manifestations of the mismatch 
between the nature of Lithuanian administration (internal factors) and the EU- 
level requirements (external factors), which pose institutional constraints. This 
section undertakes a detailed examination of how these constraints affect 
governmental capabilities to manage EU matters by looking at the way in which 
they feed into the Lithuania’s EU policy. Thus, this section proceeds to 
determine the extent to which Lithuanian governmental capabilities are adequate 
for administering EU matters. Additionally, the analysis examines the dynamics 
of national administrative adjustments to the EU’s adaptation pressures by 
looking at the key institutional and procedural changes within the Lithuania’s 
central government.
Dynamics of National Adjustments
The form that the evolution of the institutional structure of Lithuanian EU policy 
took was essentially shaped by a governmental decree in mid-1995. This decree 
established the general outline of the today’s institutional structure, which 
consists of a high-level co-ordination committee (the Governmental 
Commission for European Integration), its secretariat and a co-ordinating 
institution (the European Integration Department within the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA)) and, finally, special European affairs units within every ministry 
through which the involvement of policy ministries is ensured. The MFA 
assumed the lead responsibility for EU matters, stemming from its responsibility 
for co-ordinating external economic issues (due to the centrality of trade in the 
early relationship with the EU) and the management of foreign affairs (due to 
the connotation of the EU as an international organisation).
Subsequent adjustments to the institutional system have been 
accommodated within the old administrative framework. It is not to say that the 
evolution of the institutional structure has not been marked by significant 
institutional changes. Since the establishment of the initial machinery in mid- 
1995 a first window of opportunity to introduce significant institutional changes 
opened as early as in late-1996. Immediately after the 1996 parliamentary 




























































































Lithuanian Conservatives, the institutional machinery was overhauled. The 
Ministry of European Affairs and the Negotiations Delegation were established, 
thus bringing a clear departure from the existing institutional framework.
A new window of opportunity emerged in mid-1998, when the Minister 
for European Affairs was involved in a car accident, leading to one casualty. 
This accident further undermined her political legitimacy both within the public 
and the cabinet. This in turn triggered a governmental re-organisation, which 
affected the institutional machinery of Lithuanian EU policy. As a result of this 
reorganisation, the number of sectoral ministries has been reduced from 17 to 
14. In terms of Lithuania’s co-ordinating machinery, the Government 
Commission for European Integration was strengthened, and the European 
Committee replaced the Ministry of European Affairs. Following the 
governmental re-organisation the European Committee emerged as the winner 
of the departmental turf war with the MFA over the lead responsibility in co­
ordinating EU matters. Its terms of reference has been widened, leaving the 
MFA with only the co-ordination of the implementation of the Europe 
Agreement, technical assistance, servicing the negotiation team, and controlling 
co-operation within the framework of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security 
Policy).
This analysis suggests that significant institutional changes have been 
precipitated by internal political forces in the form of government changes (late- 
1996) or shifts in the political personalities within the cabinet (mid-1998). 
However, the Commission’s criticism with regard to Lithuania’s relatively slow 
progress towards EU membership was used as a bargaining chip to make 
politically difficult changes more legitimate. This reveals the contribution of 
external forces to the evolution of Lithuania’s institutional machinery, primarily 
in the form of the Commission’s criticisms. It is national forces, however, that 
remain key to turning windows of opportunities into significant institutional 
changes.
The mere assessment of institutional adjustments does not allow one to 
examine the effectiveness of Lithuanian EU policy. Thus, the analysis proceeds 
with a more specific analysis of Lithuanian EU policy by looking at the role of 
the civil service and policy co-ordination. It attempts to determine how the 
mismatch between the nature of Lithuanian administration and the EU 
requirements affect the Lithuanian EU policy, and, more importantly, the extent 
to which Lithuania’s current and, to a lesser degree, potential capacity for 




























































































Capabilities of Individual Institutions: the Constraint of an Inadequate 
Civil Service
With the increasing scope of EU matters, the involvement of Lithuania’s civil 
service in their administration substantially increased in quantitative terms. 
Since 1995 every ministry established a special division or department for 
European affairs. Their size and effectiveness exhibit considerable variation. 
Often, they simply oversee ministerial liaison with other ministries and the 
legislature, while other ministerial divisions deal with substantive matters falling 
under ministerial jurisdiction. Also, there was a shift of responsibilities from co­
ordinating institutions to sectoral institutions that bear main responsibility for 
sectoral alignment of national law with the acquis. Whereas until 1995 the MFA 
was responsible for virtually all Brussels business, at present every policy 
ministry is to a larger or lesser extent involved in the administration of EU 
matters. This section argues that despite these adjustments, Lithuania's civil 
service is still plagued by the lack of information and expertise on European 
affairs, which can be explained by the persistence of institutions inherited from 
the communist past and forces attributable to the transition process.
In Lithuania, each institution is allowed a great deal of autonomy to build 
its administrative capacity. At present, in the absence of a uniform civil service, 
all aspects of personnel management, including recruitment, training and 
promotion, is the employer’s duty. This is largely attributable to the post­
communist heritage: under the communism, there was no concept of a uniform 
civil service, and each public institution was an independent employer42. Under 
the principle of ministerial autonomy, it is assumed that each institution best 
understands its reform needs and is best placed to reform itself.
However, in the absence of effective central steering, the ability of 
individual central government institutions to build their administrative capacity 
has been limited and uneven. They function in a highly institutionalised 
environment that limits their ability to change the existing logic of 
appropriateness. It is evident that these institutions, whose political leadership 
has been able to recognise the gap between old practices and new demands, have 
been more responsive. However, the ability of individual institutions to see this 
discrepancy is not sufficient to ensure successful adaptation across the board at 
the governmental level.
The ability of Lithuania’s civil service to effectively manage European 
affairs is constrained by its low degree of internal coherence. Due to the absence
42 S. Synnerstrom, Professionalism in Public Service Management: The Making of Highly 
Qualified, Efficient and Effective Public Managers, Regional Conference on the Public 




























































































of a civil service under communism, Lithuania inherited a specialist-biased and 
fragmented administration, which still puts limits on effective co-ordination. 
This trend was further exacerbated during the transition process by the failure to 
establish a uniform civil service and by the deliberate decision to keep 
individual central government institutions weak in order to prevent the possible 
dominance of a single authoritarian politician over the whole Lithuanian central 
government. However, few positive trends can be identified such as the 
emergence of the network of European ‘cadres’, sharing similar values acquired 
during education, training or working together. This network, linking the 
European Committee, the European Integration Department in the MFA and 
individual European integration units in sectoral ministries, appears to be 
contributing to the coherence of Lithuanian EU policy by fostering co-ordination 
among sectoral policy institutions.
Additionally, the inherited separation between expertise in technical 
sectoral matters and expertise in foreign affairs, including foreign languages and 
diplomatic skills, constrains the evolution of administrative capabilities. 
Although this distinction is no longer appropriate as the exercise of EU 
responsibilities entails both types of expertise, it is still manifested in the 
institutional organisation of Lithuanian administration. Special units, which 
harbour expertise in foreign (including European) affairs, are responsible for the 
administration of foreign and European affairs, while other units are responsible 
for technical sectoral matters. Given this distinction, the effective exercise of EU 
responsibilities requires extensive internal co-ordination between two types of 
administrative units, which is frequently ineffective.
Lithuania's public sector is still not capable to recruit and retain qualified 
personnel. The fast growing private sector has attracted not only best graduates, 
but also best officials from the civil service primarily by offering more 
competitive salaries and better incentive structures. In parallel to the ‘brain- 
drain’, Lithuania’s civil service has been subject to a high degree of 
politicisation during the transition, stemming in part from the existence of two 
competing political parties (the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the 
Lithuanian Conservatives). In the absence of effective civil service regulation 
regarding job security, the political polarisation has produced numerous 
dismissals of officials based on political grounds. Political interests still play a 
major role in the appointment of officials. Consequently, job security has not 
been ensured, and promotion chances have been largely based on political 
loyalty rather than on performance. A combination of the high level of 
politicisation within the Lithuanian administration and its limited attractiveness 
explains, to a large extent, the limited stability of Lithuania’s civil service. This 




























































































Lithuania’s civil service: in 1997, the average career length in the Lithuania’s 
civil service was less than 3,8 years43.
The adoption and enacting of civil service legislation was not a priority in 
Lithuania during the early transition. Even though in 1994 the Lithuanian 
government finally adopted the Law on Officials, it failed to develop an 
autonomous and professional career civil service. The main imperfection of civil 
service legislation lies in its narrow scope, insufficient for creating the legal 
preconditions for the establishment of a professional civil service. The Law on 
Officials did not aim at ensuring the unification of diverse remuneration and 
grading systems within the Lithuanian public administration nor did it introduce 
effective mechanisms for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions. 
It contained no administrative appeal system to challenge illegal dismissals of 
partisan nature, thus leaving the careers of officials subject to the whim of 
political appointees. As a result, the Lithuanian government decided to draff new 
civil service legislation rather than enforce the old civil service legislation. The 
new Law on Civil Service will be biased towards the career system.
Training is still governed by the labour law rather than by the civil service 
legislation. Every state institution is bound by law to set aside a minimum of 3 
per cent of its total remuneration budget for training purposes. However, in 
reality, only a total of 0,54 per cent of the mandated 3 per cent had been spent 
during the first three quarters of 1998.44 Training possibilities in Lithuania have 
been incidental and driven more by external assistance programmes than by a 
comprehensive national programme. Training geared toward the European 
‘cadres’ does not constitute an exception, although in quantitative terms training 
opportunities for EU matters have been more extensive. The effectiveness of 
existing training programmes has been constrained by the weak ability of 
Lithuanian officials, in particular mid-career civil servants, to absorb new skills 
and, equally important, to apply them in daily work. A survey of training 
programmes carried out by one of the training institutions identified that only 49 
per cent of all participants were capable of applying their knowledge acquired 
during the training programmes.45
In the absence of a comprehensive training strategy and a school for co­
ordinating training programmes, the activities of more than 20 training
43 Lithuania’s Progress in Preparation for Membership of the European Union, July 1997 -  
July 1998, European Committee under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 1998, p. 
111.
44 Respublika, 17 November 1998, ‘Orientuoti Viesojo Valdymo Reformos Zingsniai: 
Valdymo Reformu ir Savivaldybiu Reikalu Ministro p. K. Skrebio Pranesimas LR Seime 
1998 m. Lapkricio 12 d.’, p. 9.




























































































institutions have been unco-ordinated and ineffective. This situation is in sharp 
contrast with Poland, where the Polish National School of Public Administration 
has been operating since 1990 and a comprehensive training programme is being 
implemented. To address training deficiencies, a Strategy for Training of the 
Lithuanian Civil Service for Accession to the European Union has been drafted 
and the Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration has been established in 
1999. However, it will take some time for the new institutional set-up to settle 
down and produce expected results.
Institutional Relationships: the Constraint of Ineffective Policy 
Co-ordination
Apart from the civil service, it is important to consider how institutional 
relationships that are covered by the term ‘policy co-ordination’ constrain 
Lithuania’s ability to effectively manage EU affairs. It has been noted in the 
previous section that the fragmented nature of public administration constrains 
effective co-ordination. Effective policy co-ordination is also constrained by the 
lack of expertise and information on EU matters. Since the highly technical and 
specialised nature of EU matters prevents mobility of officials within the civil 
service, other co-ordination instruments must solve co-ordination problems. It is 
important to note at the outset that the problem of weak co-ordination is not 
confined to Lithuania or other CEECs. Administrations of some member states, 
particularly in Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain, suffer from ineffective 
policy co-ordination.46
Effective co-ordination is essential for the successful negotiation process 
with the EU. Poland provides an example of how ineffective inter-ministerial 
co-ordination can slow down accession negotiations with the Commission. 
Poland was criticised for the insufficient co-ordination of its application talks 
among its ministries, when ‘one ministry does not know what the other is 
doing’.47 A lack of clear distribution of functions among the key institutions in 
charge of EU matters resulted in a considerable degree of confusion in the EU 
over ‘who was calling the tune’. The head of the Polish European Integration 
Committee has clashed with both the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Poland’s Chief Negotiator in the EU membership talks.48 Consequently, as 
Commission officials admitted, EU’s talks with Poland have proceeded slower 
than with the other four CEE first-wave applicants.49
46 L. Metcalfe, ‘International Policy Co-ordination and Public Management Reform’,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 60, No. 2 (1994), p. 289.
47 The Wall Street Journal Europe, 30 April 1998, p. 1.































































































The Lithuanian co-ordination machinery is supposed to orchestrate the EU 
policy through meetings (of the cabinet committee, inter-ministerial committees 
or the twelve legal working groups), state institutions (the European Committee 
and decreasingly the MFA) and procedures (co-ordination of draft legal acts). 
Due to the importance of high-level co-ordination the analysis starts from the 
description of the Governmental Commission for European Integration (GCE1).
GCEI is a cabinet committee headed by the Prime Minister. It has been 
argued that the GCEI failed to become a ’real decision-making body’ due to the 
combination of the infrequency of its meetings until early-1998, the lack of 
formal decision-making power (its decisions had to be referred to the 
government for its approval) and the primary control over the GCEI’s agenda by 
the MFA.50 After its re-organisation in mid-1998, the GCEI’s position has been 
consolidated by making its meetings more frequent and increasing its size. Also, 
the GCEI was empowered to make legally binding decision through the 
government centre. However, the reforms failed to produce changes in the old 
pattern of agenda setting. At present, the GCEI’s agenda is almost entirely set by 
the European Committee and dominated by the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis. Sectoral institutions are not inclined to place their issues 
on the GCEI’s agenda due to its limited capacity for arbitration and the principle 
of ministerial autonomy.
A distinctive feature in the Lithuania’s co-ordinating machinery is the 
underdevelopment of low-level co-ordination capacities. Lithuania has still not 
established a co-ordination committee bringing together permanent officials, in 
particular, the heads of European affairs units in sectoral ministries. The 
underdevelopment of low-level co-ordination capacities can in part account for 
the overload at the top of the political decision-making system. This problem is 
also acute because, given the lack of stability in the political executive in 
Lithuania, the appointment of a new political executive with limited knowledge 
in EU matters can substantially reduce the co-ordinating capacity of the 
administration. Furthermore, the performance of 12 low-level legal co­
ordinating committees, or legal working groups with responsibility for achieving 
Lithuania’s alignment with the acquis in different sectoral areas, has been 
ineffective due to the absence of clearly defined objectives and accountability 
lines to the sectoral policy ministries or the European Committee.51
50 K. Maniokas and G. Vitkus, Lithuanian Euro-institutions and Democracy, NATO Research 
Fellowship Programme, Final Report, Vilnius, 1998, p. 28.
5,Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komileto Isvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nacionalines Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 




























































































At present, the Lithuanian co-ordinating machinery reflects a balance 
between fairly heavy central co-ordination (the European Committee has staff of 
approximately 70) and large ministerial involvement. It is in contrast to such 
member states as Great Britain whose co-ordinating machinery is light (the 
Cabinet Office European Secretariat has staff of 20)52 or to such applicant 
countries as Poland whose co-ordinating machinery is extremely heavy (the 
Committee for European Integration has the largest staff in all the CEECs, 
16053). However, judging by responsibilities of the European Committee, 
Lithuania’s co-ordinating machinery is definitely light. Co-ordinating 
institutions in the EU member states with staff over 50 have much more 
extensive functions than the European Committee. In Lithuania total staff size 
and responsibilities are not closely linked, in part because the function of 
checking the (mis)match between responsibilities and administrative resources is 
not properly executed. Therefore, the relationship between total staff levels and 
functions is as much attributable to departmental competition over staff 
remuneration budgets as administrative logic.
The evolution of co-ordinating capabilities in Lithuania had been 
constrained by the existence of two concurrent secretariats, one based in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the other in the Ministry of European Affairs. This 
situation has resulted in a considerable degree of confusion over their respective 
roles in the area of European affairs and required additional co-ordination 
activity between the two. Recently, a shift in the balance of power in favour of 
the European Committee has brought significant clarity to the distribution of 
functions between two secretariats. However, despite these improvements, 
neither of two secretariats are as of yet capable of forecasting the potential 
impact of new EU legislation, in contrast to the French SGCI (the General 
Secretariat of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on European Economic Co­
operation), the Spanish SECE (the Secretariat of the State for the EU) or the 
British European Secretariat. This is also in contrast to Hungary, where a 
Strategic Task Force for European Integration within the Prime Minister’s 
Office, has long been working on costs and benefits of Hungary’s accession to 
the EU.54
52 Bulmer and Burch, p. 614.
53 T. Verheijen, ‘The Management of EU Affairs in Candidate Member States: Inventory of 
the Current State of Affairs’, in OECD, Preparing Public Administrations for the European 
Administrative Space, Sigma Papers, No. 23, Paris: OECD, 1998, p. 20.
54 ‘Hungarian Task Force Supports Country’s Integration Goals’, Public Management Forum, 




























































































Processes, Procedures and Culture
A distinctive feature of Lithuanian co-ordinating processes is the weak 
arbitration of inter-ministerial conflicts. When disputes inside the bureaucracy 
cannot be solved at lower levels, the GCEI must interfere. However, the GCEI’s 
steering and arbitration capacity is limited by the collegiate nature of 
governmental decision-making and high ministerial autonomy. Although these 
principles prevail in every modem bureaucracy, their effect in Lithuania is 
exacerbated by the lack of cohesion within its civil service (in contrast to Great 
Britain, Ireland or Denmark) and the lack of consensual decision-making style 
(in contrast to The Netherlands or Belgium). In addition, since the Prime 
Minister chairs the GCEI, the GCEI’s capacity of arbitration depends greatly on 
the Prime Minister’s willingness to interfere, which is very limited.
This constraint invariably feeds into the difficulties that the European 
Committee faces in exercising its functions, since it derives its authority from 
the GCEI. The European Committee is not willing to be involved in arbitration, 
even though there is a constant need for it, unless it is delegated by the GCEI. In 
contrast, when conflicts of interest arise among Dutch sectoral institutions, the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempts to settle them by acting as ‘a honest 
broker’, while unsettled issues are referred by the Dutch Prime Minister to a 
cabinet sub-committee, the Council for European Affairs, where conflicts are 
arbitrated before they reach the cabinet.55
The policy co-ordination culture is inadequate to meet the growing needs 
of Lithuania’s accession to the EU. In Lithuania policy co-ordination is narrowly 
equated with central control. Such elements as ‘the definition of an institutional 
mission and role’, ‘the institutional embodiment of purpose’, ‘the defence of 
institutional integrity’ and ‘the ordering of internal conflict’56, which are crucial 
for effective policy co-ordination, are often missing. The embedded principle of 
ministerial autonomy hinders the evolution of extensive information-sharing 
networks that would be likely to facilitate policy co-ordination. Though the 
European Committee does supply guidelines on the administration of EU 
matters, to whom sectoral institutions have to obey, they are not extensive and, 
most importantly, they often originate in the Commission or the EU Delegation 
in Vilnius. The practice of exchanging information through circulation lists is 
still underdeveloped, though copying letters to interested parties becomes 
increasingly popular. At the level of working groups and committees, the flow 
of information between legal working groups and responsible institutions is
55 B. Soetendorp and K. Hanf, ‘The Netherlands: Growing Doubts of A Loyal Member’, in K. 
Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the 
European Union, Longman, 1998, pp. 41-42.




























































































inadequate. All this can be contrasted with Great Britain whose culture of 
sharing information, partially stemming from the doctrine of governmental 
responsibility, is particularly conducive to policy co-ordination.57
The co-ordination of policy implementation is particularly weak. This 
stems largely from the lack of an appropriate implementation culture. In the 
communist administrative system, characterised by an excessively hierarchical 
and legalistic nature, officials were primarily concerned with carrying out 
formal orders rather than implementing their substantive provisions in practice.58 
At present, the implementation of governmental assignments is monitored on a 
similar basis. This is again in contrast to Great Britain, where the deeply 
embedded norm that the effective implementation of EU law must be ensured is 
viewed by the British European Secretariat as ‘one of the key oversight tasks’59. 
Additionally, an Austrian example illustrates that EU membership is likely to 
demand more flexibility in the future from the Lithuanian administration. After 
Austria’s accession to the EU, its deeply embedded principle that ‘all state 
behaviour has to be based on written law’ was limiting the necessary flexibility 
for the negotiations at the EU level.60
Policy Networks
The effective management of European affairs also depends considerably on the 
relationship between the civil service and specialised interest organisations. The 
EU member state administrations usually draw their expertise and information 
from various non-governmental organisations. Equally important, they rely on 
professional organisations for the implementation and enforcement of regulatory 
requirements, e.g. safety at work standards. In most member states professional 
organisations of actuaries, accountants or veterinarians exercise self­
regulation.61 Under the principle of partnership, professional organisations and 
other groups are entitled to be involved in the administration of the EU’s 
structural funds. In an attempt to increase their performance, several member 
states have consolidated their links with different interest organisations.62
57 Bulmer and Burch, p. 620.
58 N. Banr, ‘The Forces Driving Change’, in N. Barr (ed.) Labor Markets and Social Policy in 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Transition and Beyond, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 
105.
59 Ibid., p. 621.
60 P. Luif, ‘Austria: Adaptation through Anticipation’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), 
Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union, Longman, 1998, p. 
126.
61 Mayhew, p. 222.
62 France, for instance, set up a number of ‘mobilisation groups’ in an attempt to facilitate the 
exchange of information between the bureaucracy and interest organisations. See S. Mazey 




























































































Conversely, the involvement of Lithuanian interest organisations (and 
sub-national authorities) in domestic decision-making on EU matters is minimal. 
Thus, Lithuanian authorities are not capable of drawing their expertise and 
information on EU matters from such organisations. The internal organisation of 
Lithuanian interest organisations is generally weak, and there are no strong links 
between interest organisations and the Lithuanian government in the Lithuanian 
EU policy-making process. Lithuanian business and professional organisations 
are too weak to exercise self-regulation or delegated regulation. This means that 
the Lithuanian government, as other CEE governments, should assume primary 
responsibility for a larger amount of regulatory activities than their west 
European counterparts, even though it may not be best placed to do so in terms 
of knowledge and experience.63 64The development of policy networks, akin to 
those in the member states, is limited by the need to replace old policy networks, 
which collapsed as a result of the elimination of central control through 
communist party links and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, with 
completely new networks. As an example, severe tensions between revamped 
‘old’ trade unions and new unions constrain their integration into policy 
networks and thus their impact on EU matters.
In addition, the absence of intellectual discourse in Lithuania on European 
issues must be noted, which is in contrast to most EU member states where 
domestic policy communities are actively involved in the domestic EU decision­
making. In the Lithuanian context, these groups would have the potential to 
accumulate institutional memory on European matters and promote adjustments 
to the Lithuanian EU policy. However, the evolution of policy communities 
seems to be subject to ‘vicious circle’: it is largely the absence of stability within 
the Lithuania’s civil service that both hinders the evolution of policy 
communities and necessitates their establishment at the same time. In contrast to 
Lithuania, Hungary’s Strategic Task Force serves as a policy community. By 
acting as an advisory body to the Integration Cabinet and the secretariat, the 
Task Force links various research institutes, universities, chambers of commerce 
and private companies in 19 working groups, thereby generating its expertise 
and information.
Furthermore, Lithuania has missed out on the opportunity to take 
advantage of regional co-operation networks. The ability of Lithuanian
and S. Mazey (eds) The State of The European Union: Building a European Polity?, Vol. 3 
(1995), Longman, p. 353.
63 Mayhew, p. 222-223.
64 See ‘Hungarian Task Force Supports Country’s Integration Goals’, Public Management 
Forum, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1996), p. 3 or M. A. Rupp, The Pre-accession Strategy and the 
Governmental Structures of the Visegrad Countries’, in K. Herderson (ed.) Back to Europe: 




























































































authorities to learn from more advanced CEECs has been limited by several 
factors. Besides limited Lithuanian governmental capabilities to foster regional 
co-operation on EU matters, a limited willingness of some countries to work 
together with Lithuanian authorities on EU matters is particularly relevant to 
mention here. For instance, Estonia has clearly emphasised its exclusive status 
in the Baltic states, while Poland has closely worked together with Hungary on 
EU matters. A more recent feature is a growing co-operation with Latvia, 
manifested in increasing bilateral meetings between Lithuanian and Latvian 
authorities. The Lithuanian case suggests that the multilateral approach to 
screening65 applied by the Commission to the second-wave applicant countries 
has not significantly advanced co-operation on European affairs. Co-operation 
had been long hindered by the attempts of more advanced reformers to secure 
their places in the first-wave enlargement of the EU66 and the EU’s inability to 
open accession negotiations with, and offer its membership to, all the applicants. 
It is not surprising that co-operation among the first-wave applicants has become 
more intense at the expense of the second-wave applicants, when in 1997 the 
Luxembourg European Council decided to open accession negotiations with five 
CEECs.67
The constraint of weak policy co-ordination is likely to become even 
more binding after Lithuania’s accession to the EU. EU membership will further 
increase administrative requirements for Lithuanian authorities, as they will be 
involved in all stages of the European policy process, ranging from agenda 
setting to policy enforcement. In terms of different co-ordination levels, EU 
membership will bring the need for extensive policy co-ordination at the 
domestic level, at the EU level and at the domestic-EU interface.68 Weak co­
ordination is likely to limit Lithuania’s ability to maximise its advantage from 
EU membership, e.g. through its inability to define a coherent position in the 
negotiations, which is of particular importance for the small states in order to 
ensure the representation of their interests at the European level. Therefore, it is 
highly likely that inadequate policy co-ordination capabilities in Lithuania will 
render its governing system even more unwieldy unless substantial reform 
efforts will be undertaken.
65 Screening refers to systematic and detailed analysis of national legislation to check its 
compatibility with the acquis divided into 29 chapters.
66 Mayhew, p. 355.
67 They first met in Prague in late-1997 to discuss their integration strategies.




























































































The Case Study: the Implementation of the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the A cqu is  in Lithuania
This case study assesses Lithuania’s governmental capabilities to prepare, 
administer and implement the National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (NPAA). The NPAA’s importance stems from being a key instrument for 
the implementation of the Accession Partnership, which is a key element of ‘the 
[EU’s] enhanced pre-accession strategy’. The Accession Partnership, adopted by 
the Council, lists broad priority objectives for every applicant country and links 
all forms of assistance, in particular the Phare programme, for their 
achievement. The extensiveness of priority objectives depends significantly on 
the EU’s functions: EU’s policy prescriptions are less detailed in areas where the 
EU lacks authority69. These Accession Partnership objectives must be achieved 
by setting out a number of measures in the NPAA along with timetables for their 
achievement. Although the NPAA remains a national programme, its direct 
relationship to the Accession Partnership makes it similar to measures enacted 
by the member state administrations to implement EU legislation. Thus, the 
NPAA’s analysis can illuminate Lithuania’s current and future ability to enact 
EU policy measures at the domestic level.
It is necessary to note at the outset that the NPAA represents one of three 
integration programmes that exist in Lithuania, which have been drawn up in 
response to changing circumstances. When the Commission adopted its White 
Paper in 199570, the Lithuanian government adopted a National Programme for 
Legal Harmonisation (1996) in order to transpose the acquis outlined in the 
White Paper. Second, the NPAA (1998) was prepared following the adoption of 
the Accession Partnership. Finally, when the Commission published its regular 
report, Lithuanian authorities responded to it with an Action Programme 
(adopted in late-1998), whose basic objective is to address deficiencies outlined 
by the Commission in its first report until the second one is drafted. Thus, each 
integration programme has been only assessed in light of new circumstances, 
often resulting from the changes in the EU’s pre-accession strategy, rather than 
strategic integration objectives.
Since these integration programmes basically share the same objective, 
namely Lithuania’s ability to comply with the acquis, they ultimately exhibit a 
high degree of overlap, thus not only adding to administrative costs, but also 
contributing to confusion. An abundance of ‘programmes’ and ‘action plans’ 
cannot replace the need to have a single comprehensive integration strategy. 
However, its preparation is circumscribed by insufficient strategic planning and
69 See Grabbe.
70 Preparation o f the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into . 




























































































predictability not only in Lithuania, but also in the EU. Until recently, frequent 
changes in the EU’s approach to pre-accession imposed severe limits on the 
Lithuania’s ability to design the comprehensive integration strategy.
In the absence of a clear integration strategy, Lithuanian authorities are 
more exposed to a variety of external and internal demands with often 
conflicting priorities. The Commission’s proposals, flowing from its pre­
accession strategy, need to be compromised and balanced with Lithuania’s own 
organisational goals. Institutional uncertainty, coupled with significant human 
resource constraints, can in part explain the persistence of the reactive approach 
to the administration of EU matters in Lithuania. This is manifested by the 
absence of a rational approach to legal harmonisation with the acquis based on 
the prior assessment of possible domestic impacts of particular acquis 
provisions. The fact that the Lithuanian government by its decree delayed the 
implementation of some NPAA’s measures reflects that the NPAA was 
organised without having sufficient knowledge about the NPAA’s funding and 
without the a priori assessment of what it is neccesary for the achievement of 
the Accession Partnership priorities.
In addition to the constraint of the inadequate civil service, the principle 
of ministerial autonomy feeds into the NPAA’s organisation and administration. 
Primarily drafted by sectoral institutions, the NPAA represents more a collection 
of sectoral measures than a consistent programme. Such sectors as regional 
policy and economic policy are under-represented in the NPAA.71 This situation 
has been attributed to insufficient attention attached to the NPAA and the 
absence of sectoral reform strategies.72 Indeed, as the Commission noted, ‘an 
operational institutional structure for the implementation of regional policy has 
not been established in Lithuania’ and ‘Lithuania has not yet established a 
medium term economic strategy’.73
Apart from these issues, of utmost importance is the absence of an 
institution to check for a (mis)match between national sectoral measures and the 
Accession Partnership priorities. In an environment characterised by a high 
degree of ministerial autonomy and weak control by the political executive, 
sectoral institutions are not willing to present detailed measures, whose formal 
execution will be tighly controlled. Thus, it is not surprising that such sectors as 
audio-visual policies were initially left out by Lithuanian authorities in the first 
draff of the NPAA, even though they are listed in the Accession Partnership.
71 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komiteto Isvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nationalities Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 
Programos Administratima, p. 15.
72 Ibid., p. 15.




























































































Additionally, most of the NPAA’s measures are related to sectoral reform rather 
than to the implementation of EU law.74
The European Committee, having formal responsibility for the NPAA’s 
administration, does not check (and has no capacity to check) the extent to 
which the implementation of sectoral measures, as set out in the NPAA, is 
consistent with the Accession Partnership priorities. Thus, it is possible that the 
NPAA’s implementation would not lead to the full transposition of the acquis 
into national law. The European Committee acts primarily as a ‘post office’: it 
collects sectoral inputs into the NPAA and then excersises the formal and 
hierarchical control over their execution. It has been admitted that in that respect 
the performance of the European Committee does not differ from that of its 
predecessor, the Ministry of European Affairs.75 More effective monitoring of 
the NPAA, possibly including regular reports on the NPAA’s implementation, 
has the potential of enhancing its effectiveness. If the European Committee lacks 
sufficient human resources for the effective oversight of the NPAA, it can 
exercise the monitoring of the NPAA on a selective basis. The example of 
Spain, where the implementation of EU directives of an inter-ministerial or 
problematic nature are subject to more extensive oversight76, offers a possible 
instrument for Lithuania.
It is interesting to note that only the Commission has commented upon a 
(mis)match between NPAA’s measures and the Accession Partnership priorities. 
This reveals that the steering of the NPAA is exercised more by the Commission 
than the Lithuanian government.77 The Commission came to conclusion that not 
all Accession Partnership measures have been reflected in the NPAA; the NPAA 
does not cover the whole acquis', the inclusion of some NPAA’s measures lacks 
sufficient justification; information on the financial and staff resources 
necessary for the achievement of NPAA’s measures are insufficient; responsible 
institutions are not clearly spelled out; and detailed implementation schedules 
for NPAA’s measures are missing.78
The administration of the NPAA suffers from a high degree of formalism 
and rigidity. The NPAA and all changes to it must be approved by the
74 Lieluvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komiteto Isvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nacionalines Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 
Programos Administratima, p. 15.
75 Interviews with Lithuanian officials, December 1998 -  January 1999.
76 F. Morata, ‘Spain: Modernization through Integration’, in K. Hanf and B. Soetendorp (eds), 
Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union, Longman, 1998, p. 
105.
77 The Commission's steering ability is facilitated by its perception as being at the top of 
administrative hierarchy, in the same way as Moscow was perceived under the communism.




























































































govAjjpent. Delaying the implementation schedule is possible, but not looked 
f  Upon^with favour. Although sectoral institutions are entitled to amend the list of 
q  J! measures, whose implementation is their responsibility, they are not allowed to
% do it on a/i ongoing basis. Apart from this, the formal control exercised by the Europea^ Committee over the achievement of measures hinders flexibility.
Q^c «jipcf ftie cost of correcting errors is high, the adjustment of sectoral measures to 
new circumstances is infrequent. Sectoral institutions have limited incentives to 
seek efficiency gains, since the funding is allocated for separate measures and 
the limited possibility exists for redistributing resources among them. One 
solution could be the introduction of an appropriate incentive structure, 
involving such incentives as the removal of constraints or the delegation of 
authority.
Ineffective policy implementation is evident in the case of the NPAA. By 
late-1998, approximately 40 per cent of the NPAA’s measures planned for 1998 
were not carried out on time. The implementation record widely differs across 
sectors. The area entitled ‘the reinforcement of institutional and administrative 
capacity’, the essential element of the Accession Partnership, is one of the most 
lagging behind. By late-1998, Lithuanian authorities managed to carry out only 
5 administrative reform measures out of 28.79 80The late implementation of major 
legislative acts in this field has strangely been attributed by the government to 
the fact that ‘many legal acts [•••] are being harmonised with European Union 
requirements and are co-ordinated with the other national legislation’®0, although 
there are no EU legislation in this field.
The implementation of NPAA’s measures is hindered by the slow 
governmental and legislative decision-making process, which suffers from an 
enormous workload. It can be hardly surprising, since in Lithuania most EU 
pieces of legislation are incorporated into national law through parliamentary 
laws and governmental decrees. In contrast, in Denmark 85 per cent of EU 
legislative acts are administratively transformed through ‘a law of 
authorisation’.81 In early-1999, to shorten the lengthy procedures, by which 
European legislation is incorporated into the Lithuanian legal system, it was 
decided to prioritise the transposition of EU law. A special ‘fast-track’
79 Lieluvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komiteto lsvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nationalities Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 
Programos Administralima, p. 26.
80 Action Programme of the Government o f the Republic of Lithuanian for 1997-2000: At a 
Half-way Point the Major Part o f the Measures Stipulated for Four Years Have Already Been 
Implemented, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 1999 
(http://www.lrvk.lt/aktualij/progr-ang.htm).
81 S. Z. von Dosenrode, ‘Denmark: The Testing of a Hesitant Membership’, in K. Hanf and B. 
Soetendorp (eds), Adapting to European Integration: Small States and the European Union, 




























































































deliberation system for European matters has been launched. Its essence is that 
draft legal acts that are related to the transposition of EU legislation, are marked 
by ‘E’ (standing for Europe) and attributed a preferencial status in the 
governmenrtal decision-making system. However, even though it is too early to 
judge the possible effectiveness of this system, it is safe to argue that without a 
fundamental overhaul of the governmental decision-making system or of the 
transposition process the mere introduction of the ‘fast-track’ system is unlikely 
to solve this problem. The advantage of streamlining the deliberation of EU 
matters comes at the countervailing disadvantage of delaying the deliberation of 
other public matters, which may be conducive to the transition process. 
Additionally, the opportunities offered by the ‘fast-track’ system are likely to be 
soon exhausted with the increasing amount of EU matters.
Furthermore, slow implementation can be attributed to the limited 
financial resources available for funding the achievement of NPAA’s measures. 
At present, most measures are carried out by civil servants, but some of them are 
separately funded by the government. Uncertainly about the funding of 
NPAA’s measures has triggered intense competition for budgetary 
appropriations among sectoral institutions. The total size of budgetary 
appropriations requested for achieving NPAA’s measures in 1999 amounted to 
almost Ltl 2,5 bn for 1999, an increase from 1998 by remarkable 17 fold.82 
Some sectoral institutions, assuming that the NPAA’s implementation will be 
separately funded, increased the number of sectoral measures and requested 
funding for their achievement. The Ministry of Agriculture, uncertain about the 
funding of agricultural measures listed both in the NPAA and the government 
programme, attempted to secure additional funding for the achievement of the 
same measures by listing them in two different programmes.
This example illustrates that a clear position as to the funding the NPAA’s 
implementation was required before its preparation started. In contrast, the 
position of the Lithuanian authorities was ambiguous, and the NPAA’s funding 
has not been linked up to the annual budgetary process. Due to the combination 
of at least three different factors - namely the existence of overlapping 
programmes, the absence of an effective monitoring system to determine the 
appropriateness of measures and the absence of a comprehensive integration 
strategy -  it has been very difficult to match public resources with real funding 
needs. The achievement of some measures is partially or wholly funded by 
foreign assistance programmes, including Phare. Various action measures might 
be used to legitimise sectoral demands for increased appropriations rather than 
advance Lithuania’s accession to the EU. In 1999, the funding of NPAA’s 
measures envisaged from the national budget and other sources will only cover





























































































50 per cent of actual needs.83 Thus, it is highly likely that some measures, 
including those whose achievement can be of utmost importance, will remain 
short of funding and visa versa.
THE EU’S IMPACT ON THE EVOLUTION OF LITHUANIAN 
GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITIES
The problem of inadequate governmental capabilities concerns not only 
Lithuanian authorities, but also the EU because the accession of ten CEECs to 
the EU is likely to exacerbate administrative deficiencies, already existing in the 
EU. Therefore the EU needs to close the gap between the inability (or even 
unwillingness) of CEE governments to implement comprehensive administrative 
reform programmes and the basic requirement that new members must have 
effective civil services as well as effective co-ordination and monitoring 
instruments. The EU faces considerable constraints, however, in affecting 
administrative reform both in the existing member states and the candidate 
countries. Since administrative reform falls within the exclusive domain of 
national sovereignty, the EU is not capable of directly imposing its own 
administrative solutions upon them.84 These difficulties have shaped the way in 
which the European institutions have affected the management of EU matters in 
the CEECs. The analysis conceptualises the EU’s pressure by making a 
distinction between its financial aid and agenda-setting power.
It is expected that the EU’s influence, in particular the Phare programme, 
produces ‘policy learning’ effects in the CEECs, defined in terms of improved 
knowledge and skills on EU matters. As a result of ‘changing perceptions of 
how the policy problem in question is to be defined, and what appropriate 
solutions are’8 policy learning may be translated into important institutional or 
policy changes. The importance of learning in the transition countries is 
manifested in the argument that the long-term nature of institutional 
development in these countries can be explained by the substantial need for ‘the 
gradual accumulation of experience and the acquisition of skills’.86
83 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo Europos Reikalu Komiteto Isvada-Pranesimas apie 
Nacionalines Acquis Priemimo Programos Vykdyma ir Siulymai, Kaip Gerinti Sios 
Programos Aclministratima, p. 18.
J. Fournier, ‘Governance and European Integration - Reliable Public Administration’, in 
OECD, Preparing Public Administration for the European Administrative Space, Sigma 
Papers, No. 23, Paris: OECD, 1998, p. 124-125.
85 T. Conzelmann, ‘“Europeanization” of Regional Development Policies? Linking the Multi- 
Level Governance Approach with Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change’, European 
Integration online Papers, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1998) (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1998-004a.htm), 
P 8.




























































































The analysis is limited here because, ‘empirically, it is extraordinary 
difficult to show that the EU context actually induced processes of policy 
learning’.87 Thus, the EU’s impact on policy learning in Lithuania is analysed by 
looking at the extent to which the evolution of Phare has facilitated policy 
learning in the Lithuanian civil service. This approach can be partially justified 
by the uniformity of the EU’s pre-accession strategy with regard to all the 
CEECs (even after the Luxembourg summit differentiated among them), which 
is likely to have similar effects upon policy learning processes in the CEECs.
The analysis makes an assessment of the EU’s impact on the domestic 
policy-making process, since one can expect that the form that the EU’s 
influence takes, and the extent to which it is translated, is mediated by domestic 
institutional settings. The EU’s impact is mediated by national institutions, 
which have the monopoly power of translating the EU’s pressure into 
institutional and policy changes. Thus, the analysis assesses the extent to which 
the EU’s influence actually generated policy learning in the Lithuanian civil 
service and the extent to which new knowledge and skills have produced 
institutional and policy change. The case of fisheries administration examined 
below provides an example of the interplay of these factors.
The EU’s Financial Assistance and Policy Learning
The EU’s key instrument to enhance the effectiveness of managing European 
affairs in the CEECs, including Lithuania, has been its financial assistance 
through various aid instruments, and in particular through the Phare programme. 
Phare has the objective of strengthening the public administration sector so that 
it can assume the obligations of EU accession and membership. In Lithuania, 
Phare funded civil servant training, the preparation of a draft Law on Civil 
Service, the modernisation of civil servant training centres and support to the 
establishment of the Lithuanian Institute of Public Administration.
The evolution of Phare reveals the increasing ability to generate policy 
learning effects. The ‘demand-driven’ Phare (from its outset to 1997) suffered 
from several sets of problems. First, it has been pointed out that the EU seemed 
more concerned with channelling money to its highly paid consultants rather 
than actually assisting the CEECs.88 It was estimated by the European 
Investment Bank and OECD that 75 per cent of Phare allocations to the CEECs 
were channelled through European consultants operating in central and eastern
87 C. J. Bennet and M. Hewlett, ‘The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy 
Learning and Policy Change', in Policy Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1992), p. 292-294, quoted in 
Conzelmann, p. 8.
88 J. Zielonka, Policies Without Strategy: The EU’s Record in Eastern Europe, EUI, Robert 




























































































Europe. The effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of Phare suffered from its 
rigid tendering and contracting procedures, leading to long time gaps between 
the presentation of assistance proposals and the start of their implementation.89 
Even one Commissioner responsible for Phare had to admit that bureaucratic 
procedures and the lack, or low quality, of specialist knowledge hampered the 
effectiveness of European assistance to the CEECs.90 Additionally, the 
generation of policy learning effects was circumscribed by the limited 
dissemination of knowledge and skills, although the limited Phare budget points 
to the importance of spreading new knowledge as wide as possible.91
Second, the limited success of technical assistance has been attributed to 
the limited capacity of the CEECs to absorb technical assistance due to their 
weak and ill-adapted administrations as well as a lack of experience in managing 
foreign assistance programmes.92 The effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability 
of Phare projects were considerably undermined by the low degree of stability 
within the post-communist administrations. It has been pointed out that ‘the 
officials and ministers dealing with Phare change quite regularly, often causing 
lack of institutional memory which affects the running of programmes’.93 The 
Project Management Units (PMUs), which were set up within relevant sectoral 
ministries to support the administration of Phare, suffered from significant 
staffing problems94, high staff turnover and inappropriate role definition95. 
Additionally, the low planning capacity of the beneficiary countries hindered 
their ability to identify and prepare high quality Phare projects.96
It is interesting to note that Phare assistance considerably differed in its 
effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability across countries. The evaluation of 
two Phare programmes found Lithuania’s record to be the worst of four 
evaluated countries, namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland.97 To a 
large extent this stems from the low planning capacity and instability within the 
Lithuania’s civil service, illustrated by the fact that Consulta, a state-funded
Phare Customs Programmes, Evaluation Report, December 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/evaluation/phare_customs/index.htm).
90 Financial Times, 10 June 1993, ‘Brittan Admits Flaws in Aid’, p. 3.
91 Phare Restructuring and Privatisation Programmes, Evaluation Report, November 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/evaluation/phare_privat/index.htm).
92 PHARE, infoPHARE, No. 8, Brussels: European Commission, July, 1995, p. 7.
93 Mayhew, p. 145.
94 Pratley, p. 152.
95 Phare Customs Programmes.
96 Phare Cross-Border Co-operation Programme, Evaluation Report, November 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/evaluation/phare_cross_border/index.htm).
97 Phare Restructuring and Privatisation Programmes and





























































































agency for enterprise restructuring, was loosing its Phare-trained staff due to the 
insufficient commitment from the Lithuanian government to the agency’s future 
until it was finally liquidated.98
In terms of different skills, the fact that European assistance takes the 
form of the hierarchical imposition of the acquis on the CEECs has had unequal 
effects on the development of governmental capabilities.99 10The advantage of 
facilitating ‘policy management’ skills, important for the transposition of the 
acquis, has been achieved at the expense of the development of ‘policy 
entrepreneurship’ skills, key to the successful implementation and enforcement 
of the acquis as well as the future participation of the CEECs in the European 
policy process. This can partially account for the fact that the process of 
transposing the acquis in the CEECs is more driven by the rule ‘the faster, the 
better’ rather than based on the prior assessment of possible domestic impacts of 
particular EU legislative provisions.
The final set of Phare deficiencies can be explained by its ‘demand- 
driven’ nature. In the absence of specific funding priorities, Phare was primarily 
executed on the basis of the beneficiaries’ needs, to the extent that they were 
able to determine them in the terms of reference. Due to its ‘demand-driven’ 
nature, Phare sometimes was forced to support ineffective policies, e.g. in 
Bulgaria, which lacked sound restructuring policies, or Lithuania, where there 
was little stability in the privatisation policy. 00 Most importantly, Phare aid was 
not based on the principle of conditionality101, which could have been attached 
to Phare assistance in the form of ex-ante conditions (to be fulfilled prior to 
starting a Phare project) or ex-post conditions (by making future Phare projects 
dependent on existing ones).
A real break-through came in 1997, when another set of significant 
changes was enacted. The EU explicitly acknowledged the primary importance 
of the institutional and administrative capacity in the candidate countries for the 
preparations for EU membership and re-orientated the Phare programme from a 
‘demand-driven’ into an ‘accession-driven’ programme. 30 per cent of the total 
Phare assistance has been allocated to the reinforcement of administrative and 
judicial capacity in the CEECs.102 More importantly, new forms of technical
8 Phare Restructuring and Privatisation Programmes.
99 J. Caddy, ‘Harmonization and Asymmetry: Environmental Policy Co-ordination between 
the European Union and Central Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 3 
(1997), p. 325.
100 Phare Restructuring and Privatisation Programmes.
101 Ibid.
102 In late-1997, the Luxembourg European Council decided that the remaining 70 per cent of 
the overall amount, previously allocated to investment projects, will be spent on investments 




























































































assistance have been spelled out, including such important instruments as 
curricula development, bilateral co-operation and secondments. The fact that 
they pre-suppose greater involvement of both the European institutions and the 
member state administrations in the Phare management is likely to produce 
greater policy learning effects.
In addition, the 1997 reforms attempted the improve the effectiveness, 
efficiency and sustainability of Phare assistance through the principle of 
conditionality. To overcome constraints deriving from the ‘demand-driven’ 
nature of Phare and to reinforce internal reform efforts, the EU applied the 
principle of conditionality to its financial assistance in the CEECs, thus 
rendering the allocation of EU’s financial aid conditional upon the fulfilment of 
several requirements. Article 4 of a new Regulation empowers the Council to 
‘take appropriate steps’, which may take the form of cutting or suspending 
financial assistance, if any of the CEECs fails to satisfy its commitments under 
the Europe Agreement, progress towards fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria or 
the Accession Partnership priority objectives (ex-ante conditionality).103 Under 
conditionality, progress of individual CEECs will be reviewed every one or two 
years, rendering the partnership in the next year dependent upon progress 
achieved (ex-post conditionality).
These reforms are likely to generate greater policy learning effects by 
addressing the aforementioned problems stemming from the ‘demand-driven’ 
nature of Phare. The principle of conditionality is likely to facilitate the 
translation of new knowledge and skills on EU matters into institutional and 
policy changes, particularly those not desired by CEE governments. However, 
despite their advantages, the new Phare rules, in particular the principle of 
conditionality and the EU’s decision to set priority objectives for financial 
assistance through the Accession Partnerships, have been criticised by CEE 
officials.104 This may stem from the fact that while demanding higher 
administrative responsibility for managing EU affairs, they leave less autonomy. 
Additionally, the new Phare rules may be less relevant for more advanced 
CEECs with the greater planning capacity and more effective management. 
Interestingly, despite the criticisms, the Commission has already utilised its new 
powers by cutting Poland’s allocation of Phare funding for 1998 by Ecu 34 min
Communities, European Council: Conclusions of the Presidency, Bulletin of the European 
Ufiion, Luxembourg, 1997.
103 ‘Council Regulation No. 622/98 of 16 March 1998 on Assistance to the Applicant States in 
the Framework of the Pre-Accession Strategy, and in Particular on the Establishment of 
Accession Partnerships’, in Official Journal o f the European Communities, L 85, 20 March 
1998, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, p. 2.




























































































(or 16 per cent) on the basis of inadequately prepared applications for various 
Phare projects.105
In an attempt to address the constraint of the low quality of Phare 
expertise in the CEECs, the Commission launched the ‘twinning’ framework as 
part of Phare. Its basic objective is to transfer ‘the vast body of administrative 
and technical expertise’ from the member state administrations to the CEECs by 
seconding national experts to the candidate counties.106 The main advantage of 
twinning results from the direct transfer of expertise and information rather than 
through the involvement of private consultants, who sometimes lack technical 
knowledge in different policy fields. Thus, twinning is likely to significantly 
improve the transfer of knowledge to the applicant countries and corresponding 
policy learning.
However, the positive effect of twinning is likely to be circumscribed by 
several factors. Even though the Commission decided to pay a supplement to the 
seconded national officials and their respective departments through the Phare 
programme107, this is unlikely to reduce the limited ability (or even 
unwillingness) of the member state administrations to send their officials to the 
CEECs for sufficiently long time periods (in principle for twelve months) due to 
the limited number of qualified officials. This constraint can in part explain why 
only a few member states presented their twinning offers to Lithuanian 
authorities. During the presentation of their twinning proposal representatives of 
one member state admitted that they would be willing to form a ‘twining team’ 
with other member states because they have limited capacity to achieve all 
twinning goals by themselves.108 109 More importantly, the effectiveness of 
twinning is undermined by long selection procedures, even longer than those for 
the selection of private consultants. In an attempt to close the gap between the 
immediate need for Phare expertise in the structural funds area and long 
selection procedures for twinning, Lithuanian authorities even asked the 
Commission to replace a half of twinning assistance with private consultants. 
However, confident in the effectiveness of twinning, the Commission rejected
109this move.
Most recently, in early-1999 the responsibility for Phare was significantly 
devolved to the EU delegations. The main principles underlying new
105 The Economist, 6 June 1998, ‘Humble Pie for Poland’, p. 51.
106 Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998.
107 Agence Europe, 23 October 1998, ‘Commission to Launch ‘Twinning” in January 1999, 
with Dispatch of First National Officials to the Ministries of Countries Candidates for 
Accession’.
108 Interview with Lithuanian officials, January 1999.




























































































adjustments are the decentralisation of Phare management, the establishment of 
independent financial institutions and greater transparency. Following the 
introduction of the new rules the EU Delegations have been granted more 
powers. They will not only approve on behalf of the Commission the terms of 
reference, but the whole tender dossier with evaluation documents. The CEECs 
are likely to benefit from greater decentralisation through more direct contacts 
with Community officials and higher responsibilities, which are likely to lead to 
even greater learning effects. The introduction of the new rules was marked by 
disagreements between two DG I directorates over the extent to which social 
security costs can be funded by Phare, important for the CEECs in attracting 
qualified personnel to participate in different Phare projects. At present, the rule 
remains that Phare can only finance maintenance and operating costs for training 
and research programmes.
Finally, it is necessary to note the EU’s decision to use Phare for funding 
the participation of the CEECs in various Community programmes, which pre­
supposes the spread of significant policy learning effects to interest 
organisations. Since 1998 Lithuania has benefited from three European cultural 
programmes, namely Ariane, Kaleidoscope and Raphael. All the CEECs will be 
fully associated with the Fifth Community Framework for Research and 
Technological Development on the ‘step-by-step’ basis.110 Once legal and 
practical preparations are finished, Lithuania will join the Medium-term 
Community Action Programme on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women111. 
Lithuania’s participation in the SAVE II programme for the promotion of energy 
efficiency, the programme on the prevention of AIDS and other communicable 
diseases as well as the programme on drug dependence is being discussed.112 To 
overcome the limited ability of the CEECs to pay their financial contributions 
for the participation in the Community programmes, Phare co-funds the 
participation of the CEECs in the Community programmes. Under the terms and 
conditions adopted by the Association Council, Lithuania will only pay 10, 30 
and 50 per cent of the cost of its participation in Kaleidoscope and Raphael from
110 Agence Europe, 27 July 1998, ‘Commission Calls on Council for Brief to Negotiate 
Association of Applicant Countries in 5TH Framework Programme for Research’ and Agence 
Europe, 15 May 1998, ‘Most CEECs Contemplating “Step-by-Step” Participation in 5TH 
Framework Programme for Research and Call for Phare Programme Financing -  Positions of 
Countries’.
111 Agence Europe, 30 December 1998, ‘European Commission Interim Report on the Action 
Programme on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women Takes Stock of Progress Achieved 
and Describes Actions to be Developed’.
112 Agence Europe, 11 May 1998, ‘Commission Proposes that Council Authorise Participation 




























































































its national budget of 1998, 1999 and 2000 respectively. 113 The remaining 
percentage will be financed from Lithuania’s annual Phare allocations.
The evolution of the Phare programme reveals a great deal about both the 
EU’s policy preferences and its understanding of reform needs in the CEECs 
with regard to strengthening the CEECs’ commitment to reform their 
administrations. The 1994 Phare reforms are illustrative of the EU’s limited 
commitment to increasing the ability of the CEECS to meet obligations of EU 
membership. Behind this stands the fact that according to one Community 
official ‘the level of seriousness about enlargement [in the EU] is not minimal, it 
simply does not exist’.114 Conversely, the 1997 Phare reforms reveal not only 
increasing European commitment, but also increasing understanding of internal 
institutional factors that limit external efforts to make the management of EU 
matters more effective. The latest reforms are the most significant in terms of 
policy learning. By aiming to prepare the CEECs for the administration of future 
structural funds through the decentralised management of Phare they are most 
likely to render internal constraints less binding, thus advancing the emergence 
of adequate governmental capabilities to manage EU matters.
In sum, it was primarily through the transfer of knowledge and expertise 
by Phare that the post-communist administrations discovered the nature of 
European requirements in different policy fields and could in turn outline their 
reform needs. However, it is expected that mere policy learning is insufficient 
for ensuring the evolution of adequate governmental capabilities, since the 
translation of new knowledge and skills into policy actions or institutional 
changes is much more difficult and is subject to the old logic of appropriateness. 
The higher effectiveness of Phare assistance to training in Lithuania compared 
to other type of projects can be largely explained by the lack of need to translate 
training outputs into policy and institutional changes.115 After discussing the 
EU’s agenda-setting power, the analysis will proceed to examine the ability of 
Lithuanian authorities to transfer new knowledge into policy actions and 
institutional changes by looking at the fisheries example.
113 See ‘Decision No. 4/98 of the Association Council Adopting the Terms and Conditions for 
the Participation of Lithuania in the Community Programmes in the Field of Culture’, in 
Official Journal of the European Communities, L 35, 9 February 1999, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, pp. 42-44.
114 Financial Times, 16 November 1995, ‘Brussels Keeps Shut the Gates to the East’, p. 25.




























































































The EU has also influenced the capacity of the CEECs to manage EU affairs by 
setting both the formal and informal agenda of CEE governments.116 1789The 
Commission sets the informal agenda of CEE governments through identifying 
particular problems and proposing specific policy solutions. The importance of 
EU membership to the CEECs and limited domestic expertise on EU matters 
facilitate the EU’s ability to exercise its agenda-setting power. It is relevant to 
note that although the Commission does not have a monopoly over setting the 
agenda of CEE governments, it is better placed to do so than other European 
institutions or even the member states. It enjoys the formal executive authority 
delegated by the Council for eastward enlargement and possesses both the 
expertise and financial resources. Because of the wide scope of the Accession 
Partnerships, the Commission’s influence over policy-making in the CEECs 
‘goes beyond the EU’s role in the domestic policy processes of its member 
states’.11
One can identify several EU’s agenda-setting instruments, which vary in 
their effectiveness. Initially, bilateral meetings between CEE and European 
officials within the framework of the Europe Agreements served as an informal 
agenda-setting instrument. Their effectiveness was limited by the fact that the 
Association Council meets once a year, while the Association Committees meet 
once or twice a year. Despite this, they still act as the important agenda-setting 
instrument by serving as constructive forums for discussing broad, but important 
policy issues.1'8 The bilateral meetings became increasingly ineffective due to 
the increasing lack of ministerial time, as the number of the associated countries 
increased from three (Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia) to ten."9 In 
response to this, the 1994 Essen summit adopted the ‘structured relationship’ 
(otherwise entitled ‘structured dialogue’), or the multilateral framework within 
which heads of state and government as well as sectoral ministers coming from 
both sides can debate European affairs.
However, the influence of the structured relationship on the governmental 
capabilities for administering EU matters in the CEECs through agenda setting
116 Formal agenda setting is defined as the ability to set the procedural agenda, while informal 
agenda setting - as the ability to set the informal or substantive agenda. See M. A. Pollack, 
‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’, International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), p. 121.
117 See Grabbe.
118 For instance, in early-1999 the EU-Lithuanian Association Council meeting discussed the 
national energy strategy, public administration reform, border control and control of illegal 
migration. See Lietuvos Rytas, 23 February 1999, ‘Liuksemburge -  Apie Lietuvos Ateiti’, p. 
2.
119 Mayhew, p. 163.




























































































have been largely limited for several reasons. Similar to the meetings within the 
framework of the Europe Agreements, the structured relationship meetings are 
normally held only once a year, except for the Council of Justice and Home 
Affairs and the General Affairs Council, which meet twice a year. Further 
limiting their effectiveness, they are not preceded by any prior exchange of 
information or preparatory expert meetings. Consequently, they are hampered 
by broad agendas, divergent views among the CEECs and extremely limited 
time.120 Although several changes (preparatory expert meetings and prior 
exchange of information, shorter agenda, concrete recommendations after each 
meeting) have been agreed with regard to the structured dialogue following the 
increasing criticism from the CEEC121, it has been pointed out that no substantial 
improvements have been achieved122 123. Finally, the effectiveness of the structured 
relationship is frequently impeded by the lack of knowledge on EU matters or 
institutional memory in the CEECs due to the unstable nature of CEE 
administrations discussed above.
The Commission’s opinions (1997a) and later regular reports (1998b) on 
the readiness of the CEECs to accede to the EU, which serve as another informal 
agenda-setting instrument, have been much more effective. In its opinions, the 
Commission identified particular obstacles to meeting the obligations of EU 
membership (e.g. ineffective public administration in Lithuania) and offered 
policy proposals for their resolution (e.g. undertaking official training, bringing 
remuneration in the public sector in line with that in the private sector).12 
However, the Commission’s opinions proved to be insufficient for overcoming 
internal institutional constraints. Although the Commission spunred the 
development of Lithuanian regional policy by pointing out that its absence will 
hinder Lithuania’s accession to the EU, its progress still remains limited due 
weak inter-ministerial co-ordination and a lack of expertise and information on 
EU regional policies. Delayed EU membership did not serve as a sufficient 
threat to the Lithuanian government to reform its regional policy institutions and 
rules.
Recently, several reform steps have been undertaken by the EU to 
strengthen internal administrative reform efforts. Most policy solutions 
identified by the Commission in its opinions have been negotiated into short-
120 V. Birkavs, ‘Planning EU Integration After Cannes’, Public Management Forum, Vol. 1, 
No. 3 (1995), p. 1.
121 Agence Europe, 27 February 1998, T5 Member States and 9 Associate Countries Make 
Improvements to “Structured Dialogue” *.
122 Rupp, p. 94.
123 J. Fournier, ‘Administrative Reform in the Commission Opinions Concerning the 
Accession of the Central and Eastern European Countries to the European Union’, in OECD, 
Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative Space, Sigma Papers, No. 




























































































term or medium-term reform objectives and embodied in the Accession 
Partnership agreements between the EU and the individual CEECs.124 The 
Accession Partnership agreement between the EU and Lithuania includes, 
among other things, the introduction of a comprehensive official training 
programme on EU matters. More importantly, progress on implementing those 
reform objectives has been clearly linked to EU’s financial assistance. This 
reflects the increasing understanding in the EU that its ability to influence the 
performance of CEE administrations largely depends on the link between its 
separate instruments, namely financial assistance and agenda setting.
As a result, the 1998 Phare programme for Lithuania, amounting to Ecu 
29,1 min, is designed on the basis of priority objectives specified in the 
Accession Partnership. The 1998 Phare programme covers five broad objectives, 
namely justice and home affairs, environment, energy, transport and reinforcing 
institutional and administrative capacity. The last objective is the most 
significant in terms of financial resources in the Phare programme: a total of Ecu 
11,8 bn will be allocated for this objective. Most importantly, the 
implementation of the 1998 Phare programme is linked to the principle of 
conditionality through the Financing Memorandum, signed between the 
European Community and the Government of Lithuania in late-1998.125
In the Financing memorandum, the principle of conditionality is most 
often linked to the availability of sufficient counterpart staff from the Lithuanian 
administration financed from the national budget in the policy fields of 
agriculture, regional policy and cohesion, environment and transport. This 
reflects the Commission’s concern about the Lithuanian human resources 
needed to effectively manage individual assistance projects foreseen by the 1998 
Phare programme. In addition, the principle of conditionality is also linked to 
the adoption of new legal acts in the policy fields of social security, environment 
and energy, the establishment of proper co-ordination mechanisms to avoid 
fragmentation of justice and home affairs actions and to the availability of 
national budgetary funds to co-fund transport projects.
It is important to note that by linking its financial assistance and agenda 
setting, the EU has become empowered to set the formal agenda for the CEECs.
‘Council Decisions 98/259/EC - 98/268/EC’, in Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 121, 23 April 1998, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities.
125 See Special Provisions (Annex C), Financing Memorandum between the European 
Community and the Government of Lithuania, 10 December 1998. Under the Financing 
Memorandum, Lithuania is obliged to meet a number of priority objectives specified in the 





























































































This linkage extended the principle of conditionality to the EU’s power of 
agenda setting. Thus, the Accession Partnership priority objectives have been 
endowed with ‘if not quasi-legal, at least very formal’ character.126 This has 
already placed the implementation of priority objectives, set out in the 
Accession Partnership, high on the agenda of the Lithuanian government, thus 
strengthening its reform efforts. Following the Commission’s remarks outlined 
in its opinion, in late-1997 the Lithuanian government adopted by decree an 
action plan with a number of priority measures in preparation for the Accession 
Partnership. In a similar way, following the Commission’s remarks specified in 
its regular report on Lithuania’s progress to accede to the EU, in late-1998 the 
Lithuanian government adopted a new action plan. Under this action plan, a 
number of measures should be achieved by mid-1999 when the Lithuanian 
government will start drafting its second progress report for the Commission. 
One can conclude that the EU’s pressure for administrative adaptation, exerted 
through linking its financial assistance to agenda setting, has considerably 
strengthened internal reform efforts in Lithuania.
Screening, which was launched by the Commission in mid-1998, 
represents another powerful agenda-setting instrument. The Commission 
simultaneously manages bilateral screening processes with each first-group 
applicant country and one multilateral screening process with all the applicant 
countries. Both screening processes are largely similar: they are carried out by 
‘the same Commission officials, on the basis of the same acquis communautaire, 
on the basis of the same questionnaire’.127 However, while the multilateral 
screening was limited to ‘pedagogical’ meetings in which the Commission 
explained the acquis to all the applicant countries, the bilateral screening went 
beyond that and also examined difficulties involved in adopting and 
implementing the acquis in the first-wave applicant countries.128 Another 
difference stems from the fact that, at the end of the screening, the Commission 
will make recommendations to the Council only with respect to the bilateral 
screening. Due to these differences the first-wave applicant countries are 
exposed to slightly higher adaptation pressure than the second-wave applicant 
countries. For instance, more advanced candidate countries must prepare their 
negotiating positions on the different chapters of the acquis. Thus, it appears that 
the involvement of the first-wave countries in the bilateral screening generates 
higher policy learning effects than in the second-wave applicant countries. Since
126 Krenzler, p. 14.
127 Agence Europe, 11 June 1998, ‘Screening with the Five Applicant Countries of the Second 
Group Should Be Over in Spring 1999 -  In November, Commission to Adopt its Evaluation 
Reports on Situation in All Applicant Countries’.
128 Agence Europe, 30 July 1998, ‘Commission and Five Applicant Countries of Second 




























































































early-1999 the bilateral screening has also been extended to the second-wave 
applicant countries.
Finally, the EU sets the agenda of Lithuania’s central government through 
informal means. The Commission’s pre-occupations are communicated to the 
Lithuanian government through the EU Delegation, the Phare Office and 
directly from Brussels through DG 1A or sectoral DGs. For instance, it is 
through these institutions that the Commission repeatedly expressed its concern 
about Lithuanian capabilities to administer a special project for structural funds 
in the Phare programme. The Commission even requested a clear definition of 
administrative resources lacking for the effective exercise of the project with a 
detailed staffing plan. The repeating reference to national administrative 
resources shows that the Commission exploits all agenda-setting instruments to 
achieve its objectives. However, the informal agenda-setting instruments of the 
EU are less powerful by definition. By being less institutionalised they do not 
well adhere to the Lithuanian legalistic and hierarchical nature of public 
administration.
The Case Study: the Administration of Fisheries
This analysis argues that it is national institutional settings that are essential in 
determining the outcome of the EU’s influence on policy and institutional 
changes that affect the evolution of governmental capabilities. This is 
particularly the case because most of the EU’s instruments with which it 
influences the evolution of governmental capabilities, in particular most 
Accession Partnership priority objectives, have the quality of being vague and 
hence require interpretation in the domestic context. In addition, the 
Commission cannot infringe upon the principle of national sovereignty nor does 
it have enough internal resources to design more specific Accession Partnership 
priority objectives. To determine the impact of national institutions, the analysis 
examines the case of fisheries administration that was selected on the basis of a 
large discrepancy between the post-communist heritage and the EU 
requirements in the fisheries field.
The fisheries administration represents one of few issues that need to be 
addressed. At present, the fisheries sector is jointly administered by two 
different institutions, namely the Department of Fishery Resources in the 
Ministry of Environment and the Department of Fisheries in the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The present situation reflects the communist past: under the 
communism, the fisheries sector was under the direct control of Moscow, which 
had overall responsibility for the fisheries sector, while two committees in the 
Lithuanian Soviet administration enjoyed some decentralised responsibility. In 
mid-1997, the Commission’s opinion on Lithuania (1997a) produced the 




























































































that ‘it will be necessary for Lithuania to establish a fisheries administration 
which corresponds to the Community requirements of managing fishing stocks, 
fishing, fish processing and fish trade, and which is capable of collecting data 
and co-ordinating the necessary restructuring’.129 Its important role was noted by 
Lithuanian officials who admitted that without this opinion the re-organisation 
of fisheries administration would not have been placed on the agenda of the 
Lithuanian government.130
This criticism was accompanied by the transfer of new knowledge in the 
form of a report on the fisheries administration in the EU member states from 
Danish consultants. The recipient of foreign assistance, the Department of 
Fisheries, learned that in all EU member states the control over the fisheries 
sector was entrusted to agricultural ministries following national adjustments to 
the CFP (Common Fisheries Policy) or, more specifically, the increasing 
importance of fish processing (relative to fish conservation) and the location of 
the fisheries support instrument within the EAGGF (European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund). The report, coupled with the Commission’s 
opinion, strengthened the bargaining power of the Ministry of Agriculture vis-à- 
vis the Ministry of Environment over the re-organisation of fisheries 
administration.
It was against this background that reform efforts for the fisheries 
administration have been initiated. The Ministry of Agriculture took the position 
that a single responsible institution must be introduced. However, this position 
received an outright rejection by the Ministry of Environment. It is not 
surprising because both institutions, albeit acting in the same policy area, view 
the fisheries sector through different lenses. The Ministry of Agriculture is 
mostly concerned with the processing of fish products, while the Ministry of 
Environment emphasises the conservation of fish resources. This situation 
produced a long turf battle between the two ministries. The Ministry of 
Environment has declined to agree with the provisions of the draft Law on 
Fisheries, which referred to the administration of fisheries by one institution. 
Consequently, the adoption of the Law on Fisheries, which cover another 
important aspects, has been delayed for three years. An attempt to merge two 
institutions before adopting the Law on Fisheries has also been blocked by the 
Ministry of Environment. A draft government decree that foresaw a transfer of 
the Department of Fishery Resources to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Agriculture with its budgetary allocations and property did not come into force.
129 The Commission Opinion on Lithuania's Application for Membership o f the European 
Union, 1997.




























































































Once inter-ministerial co-ordination proved to be insufficient, attention 
was turned to outside interventions. Following a discussion on the 
administration of fisheries, the Parliamentary Committee on Rural Affairs 
recommended that the government have to merge two fisheries departments into 
one under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. However, no action 
followed this recommendation. The Prime Minister attempted to resolve this 
issue by authorising two sectoral policy ministries to draft a re-organisation plan 
for fisheries that would include the establishment of one institution responsible 
for fisheries. This resolution has not been implemented either. The inability to 
resolve the long-standing conflict over the fisheries administration illustrates the 
weak arbitration capacity of the government centre.
The current situation can be described as ‘negative co-ordination’, in 
which both responsible institutions exercise their formal functions and 
contribute minimal efforts to inter-ministerial co-ordination. This situation 
largely derives from the deeply embedded principle of ministerial autonomy. 
Inter-ministerial co-ordination takes place within the working group for fisheries 
which is composed of 4 officials coining from the Ministry of Agriculture and 2 
officials coming from the Ministry of Environment. However, in the absence of 
a stable administrative structure for fisheries inter-ministerial co-ordination is 
not sufficient to ensure the effective administration of fisheries or, more 
specifically, the achievement of such tasks as drawing up a register of fishing 
vessels or ensuring that the fish processing in Lithuania is in conformity with 
European norms.
In late-1998, the Commission’s regular report on Lithuania, which 
reiterated that ‘Lithuania needs to undertake legislative and administrative 
reforms to implement the Common Fisheries Policy’131, re-opened this 
discussion after all means have been exhausted by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Following the discussions of the Commission’s regular report in the 
Governmental Commission for European Integration, the European Committee 
has been entrusted to present its solutions on this matter. However, after the 
failure of governmental intervention, it is highly unlikely that this decision will 
end the long conflict between two sectoral ministries over the administration of 
fisheries.
The fisheries case illustrates that the form the re-organisation of fisheries 
administration is taking is subject to the governmental decision-making process 
characterised by high ministerial autonomy, collegiality, weak inter-ministerial 
co-ordination and weak arbitration of inter-ministerial disputes. This explains 
why attempts to impose unilateral solutions have been ineffective. It also




























































































illustrates that the old logic of appropriateness is deeply embedded in the 
national institutional settings. This is evident by the fact that the re-organisation 
of fisheries administration lasted for more than three years and that the 
possibility of delayed EU membership has not been sufficient force for 
overcoming the impact of deeply embedded national institutions.
CONCLUSION
This analysis has presented an explanatory framework for the study of 
governmental capabilities based on the new institutionalist insights and applied 
it to the administration of EU matters in Lithuania. It has demonstrated that 
Lithuania’s current governmental capabilities to manage EU matters are 
inadequate. This can be illustrated by the ineffective Lithuanian EU policy, 
including the ineffective management of the National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis. The inadequacy of governmental capabilities can be 
partly explainèd by the binding nature of institutional constraints that are 
defined by internal factors (the post-communist legacy and the transition 
process) and external factors (the EU’s nature) and manifested in the mismatch 
between the basic characteristics of Lithuanian administration and the EU 
requirements.
If this mismatch can partly explain the inadequacy of govermental 
capabilities to manage EU matters in Lithuania, its power to explain domestic 
institutional and policy adjustments to EU-level requirements is very limited. 
They cannot be explained in terms of the magnitude of the capability- 
requirement gap. For instance, administrative adaptation in the fisheries area is 
very slow despite the large mismatch between the EU requirements and the 
characteristics of Lithuanian institutional set-up. To explain domestic and 
institutional policy adjustments, one must look at the EU pressure and the 
domestic decision-making logic.
For the EU pressure, the ability and willingness of Lithuanian authorities 
to close the capability-requirements gap depended substantially on the pressure 
exerted by the EU institutions, particularly by the European Commission, 
through their agenda-setting instruments, particularly through the Accession 
Partnership. Additionally, this analysis indicated that Lithuanian policy and 
institutional changée have been facilitated by the EU’s Phare programme, which 
generated significant policy learning effects in Lithuania’s administration. The 
EU’s decision to link its financial assistance to agenda setting through the 





























































































The domestic decision-making logic represents more powerful 
explanatory tool. The capability-requirements gap cannot account for the uneven 
pattern of institutional and policy change within the Lithuanian central 
government. This analysis indicates that the change pattern is marked by a 
contrast between radical changes to the Lithuanian central government structure 
and the Lithuanian institutional structure for co-ordinating EU matters on the 
one hand and incremental changes to ministerial and governmental decision­
making processes and staff management practices on the other. This contrast can 
be explained by different ‘path-dependency’ levels, which are in turn influenced 
by the extent to which different institutions are embedded into national 
institutional settings. Lithuania’s formal institutional structure, which was 
determined by initial reform choices during the transition period, is less 
institutionalised than decision-making processes and staff management 
practices, which were inherited from the communist past.
The different levels of embededdness can also be explained by the higher 
sensitivity of formal institutional structures to political pressures that often result 
from the dissatisfaction of political institutions with government performance. 
This can be illustrated by the example that major changes to the Lithuanian 
institutional structure for co-ordinating EU matters have been precipitated by 
political factors. For Lithuanian policy-makers this contrast implies that the real 
challenges to the Lithuanian EU policy lie not in the formal government 
structure itself, but in the wider institutional framework within which it operates.
It has been also demonstrated by this analysis that the binding force of 
institutional constraints that hinders the development of governmental 
capabilities is currently more conditioned by internal factors than external 
factors. Since the Lithuanian EU policy is still dominated by the transposition of 
EU legislation into national law, institutional constraints that result from the 
mismatch between the nature of Lithuanian administration and the EU 
requirements have not fully materialised yet. For Lithuanian decision-makers 
this means that the most needed reform efforts are those that address the binding 
character of internal factors.
Additionally, these domestic reform efforts are capable of increasing the 
effectiveness of EU’s reform efforts (financial assistance and agenda setting), 
whose success is highly dependent upon national institutional settings. Even 
though Phare assistance rendered institutional constraints less binding by 
generating significant policy learning effects, its ability to produce policy and 
institutional changes has been subject to the old logic of appropriateness. 
Specifically, the fisheries case study showed the way in which both the impact 
of new knowledge and the EU’s agenda-setting power was mediated by national 




























































































process. Even the possibility of delayed EU membership has not enabled yet to 
overcome the impact of deeply rooted national institutional factors in the 
fisheries sector.
Finally, it is important to put the development of adequate governmental 
capabilities in the context of EU enlargement. For the EU’s pre-accession 
process the absence of adequate governmental capabilities in Lithuania refers 
not only to its limited capacity to fulfil obligations of EU membership, but also 
to its limited ability to negotiate favourable terms of accession with the EU. 
However, one should not exaggerate the problem of inadequate administrative 
capabilities in Lithuania. This problem can be also observed in other CEECs and 
the EU member states, in particular in the area of implementing and enforcing 
the acquis. In addition, the candidate countries have to comply with wider 
acquis than the existing member states, they have no ‘opt-out’ possibilities and 
the very narrow scope to negotiate long transitional periods, all factors implying 
enormous challenges for the state capabilities. The potential benefits of eastward 
enlargement132 must not prevent Lithuania’s accession to the EU, even if it 
currently lacks adequate governmental capabilities for the effective 
administration of EU matters.
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